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ABSTRACT
The West's image of Finland and its policy towards Finland during 
World War II and the Cold War has been thought to be an exception to the 
framework of power politics and diplomacy. This thesis will seek to 
determine the validity of this assumption in the United States and Great 
Britain by examining the popular press of each country. This thesis will also 
explore what differences if any existed between the Anglo and American 
press. This thesis will attempt to understand the analysis, judgments, and 
opinions of the Anglo and American press regrading Finland and their 
impressions as to what the appropriate responses of Great Britain and the 
United States should be towards Finland. This thesis discusses how accurate 
their observations and assessments were and within that context determines 
whether or not Finland can be considered a special case.
The Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union was widely 
covered in the Anglo and American press. The foremost common theme 
was an almost universal sympathy and admiration for the Finns. The press 
response to Finland was due partly, but not exclusively, to its sentiment 
toward the Soviet Union. The Winter War created the image of "Valiant 
Finland," wdth the press portraying Finland as a defender of Western 
Civilization, particularly democracy and Christianity. The Winter War and 
the press coverage of it created a substantial reservoir of goodwill for Finland. 
This combined with Finland's already positive image as an honest debt 
paying nation.
V l l
During the Continuation War Finland fought as a co-belligerent of 
Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, but only to regain the territory it lost 
in the Winter War. Finland was trapped in a tricky geopolitical and 
diplomatic situation. As the war continued the Anglo and American press 
became more and more critical of Finland's role, but distinguished between 
the actions of the Finnish government and the Finnish people. After World 
War II the Anglo and American press paid little attention to daily life in 
Finland. The events that brought attention to Finland were often events in 
which Finland appeared to be exceptional when compared to other nations 
thought to be in similar circumstances. Finland's image evolved through 
the years. The Anglo and American press recognized Finland as a 
functioning democracy, but they did not altogether regard Finland as neutral. 
The press stressed the image of "Honest Finland" as the Finns completed 
their reparation payments to the Soviet Union in 1952. The press described 
Finland as a democratic nation that shared Western values but that 
circumstances did not allow it to exercise a pro-West foreign policy.
Although the United States and Great Britain were allies in World 
War II and the Cold War, some differences occurred in their respective 
coverage of Finland, as their national interests diverged. Given the 
geopolitical reality that placed Finland in political alignments that did not 
support British and American interests, the Anglo and American press 
coverage of Finland revealed an unmistakable reservoir of goodwill and 
sympathy for the Finnish people. The Anglo and American press coverage of 
Finland between 1939 and 1955 was indeed an exception to the conventional 
framework of power politics and diplomacy. Finland was a special case.
V l l l
I. INTRODUCTION
The powerful exact what they can 
and the weak grant what they must.
Thucydides*
Geography has been unkind to Finland, and remains today perhaps the 
single most defining factor of Finnish daily life and its national existence.
Not only is the northern climate frequently inhospitable and the rocky soil 
poor, Finland's location on the northwestern flank of Russia or the Soviet 
Union has inextricably tied its fate to the security concerns and expansionist 
policies of its powerful neighbor. Finland's traumatic history since 
independence in 1917 is a fascinating example of a small power trying to 
survive between antagonistic great powers: first between Germany and the 
Soviet Union during World War II and then during the Cold War between 
the western democracies, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union.2 
During this period Finland was twice defeated by the Soviet Union yet 
remained an unoccupied and independent nation. As a result of the Winter 
War and the Continuation War, Finland was left with large reparation 
payments owed to the Soviet Union and much of its territory lost or
! Thucydices, The Peloponnesian Wars, as cited in Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, 
Medieval, and Modern, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 16.
2 For a description of Finland's history prior to the Winter War see John Wuorinen, A 
History of Finland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), for a concise recent history 
of Finland see Fred Singleton, A Short History of Finland, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), and for an understanding of Finland within the context of Scandinavia see 
Thomas Derry, A History of Scandinavia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
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destroyed.3 After World War II the Finns pursued a policy of peaceful 
relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1955 the Soviet Union had 
agreed to withdraw from its military base in Finnish territory, and tacitly 
consented to Finland's joining the United Nations and the Nordic Council. 
These events marked the attainment of Finland's foreign policy goal: to 
pursue a course of neutrality that was legitimately accepted by both the West 
and the East.4 Yet if Thucydides' dictum (above) remains an absolute tenant 
of the relations between nations then there would be little point in studying 
the history of Finland or any other small power, except for personal curiosity, 
for there would be nothing more to learn about the relations between the 
powerful and the weak. History, as life, is seldom that simple, as Finland's 
experience between 1939 and 1955 demonstrates. This experience raises the 
question as to what extent Finland, or any small power, can influence its 
future by its own actions and to what extent its fate rests upon the whims of 
great powers.
Finland was certainly a unique case, a democracy fighting against an 
enemy of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union during World War II and 
surviving afterwards to be the only democracy to border the Soviet Union in 
Europe during the Cold War. Classifying Finland strictly as either an ally of 
the Western democracies or a Soviet satellite was problematic, but it was 
equally difficult for Finland to be accepted as strictly neutral. Though 
Finland's government often appeared to be on the wrong side of the issues 
according to the preferences of the United States and Great Britain, the Finns
3 Charles Lundin, Finland in the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1957) provides a good description of Finland's two wars with the Soviet Union and its one 
war with Germany between 1939 and 1945 and offers a helpful analysis and critique of 
earlier works on the subject in Finnish, English, and German.
4 See Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality (New York: Praeger, 1969) for an insightful 
perspective on Finnish foreign policy since Finland's independence from the viewpoint of a 




enjoyed an enviable reputation in the press of both countries as individuals 
and as a people. The West's image of Finland and its policy towards Finland 
during World War II and the Cold War has been thought to be an exception 
to the framework of power politics and diplomacy. This study will seek to 
determine the validity of this assertion by examining the portrayal of Finland 
in the popular press of Great Britain and the United States. This study will 
also pursue what differences, if any, existed between the Anglo and American 
press regarding Finland. Building on Michael Berry's American Foreign Policy 
and the Finnish Exception (1987), which examined the American press from 
1939-1944, this study will consider whether his selections from the American 
press were representative of American opinion and how accurate Berry's 
conclusions were. It seeks to provide a better understanding of Finland 
during this period and identify those factors that influenced the views of 
Finland portrayed in the press, thereby determining whether or not Finland 
was indeed a special case, as Berry contends.
Two separate paradigms, Berry argues, described the United States' 
view of Finland and they became mutually reinforcing. The first was that of 
"Honest Little Finland," arising from the fact that Finland continued 
throughout the 1930s to punctually meet its small debt payments to the 
United States for a loan it had received following World War I while the rest 
of Europe had long ago defaulted on their war debts. The other image was of 
"Valiant Little Finland" defending Western civilization against its 
archenemy, which arose during the Winter War with the Soviet Union.
Berry believes the "Honest" image to be in line with the positive thrust of 
American foreign policy as Finland epitomized the United States' ideal for 
peacetime free trade relationships. The "Valiant" image has a somewhat 
negative connotation as the western community was tentatively defined by
5
the presence of a shared enemy.5 This study will discuss to what extent these 
images continued to be portrayed throughout the Anglo-American press, if at 
all, and to what degree these images evolved between 1939 and 1955.
Periodicals researched to obtain the portrayal of Finland in the Anglo 
press were: the Times (London), the critical and conservative Economist, the 
laborite Manchester Guardian Weekly, and the leftist New Statesmen and Nation. 
Periodicals researched to obtain an accurate portrayal of Finland in the 
American press were the two most widely read weekly news magazines Time 
and Newsweek, the nations's preeminent daily the New York Times, the 
regionally influential Minneapolis Morning Tribune, the left leaning Nation and 
New Republic, and Foreign Affairs Quarterly.
Special attention is given to the coverage of particular events: the
Winter War and Finland's entry, participation, and exit from the
Continuation War as an ally of Germany. Postwar events discussed are
reconstruction, the 1948 Crisis, reparation repayment, and the Soviet
withdrawal from Porkkala. This study, however, is not a day by day chronicle
of the news but an attempt to understand the judgments, opinions, and
analysis of the Anglo-American press regarding Finland and their
impressions as to what the appropriate responses of Great Britain and the
United States should be toward Finland. To what degree did the press reflect
a split personality? That is, to what extent was there disagreement between
the "hearts" and the "minds" of the press? Was coverage of Finland colored
by idealism or did it represent realpolitik? How does the view of Finland
change in the Anglo-American press as the Soviet Union goes from being a de
facto ally of Germany in the early days of World War II, to an essential partner
in the alliance that defeated Nazi Germany, to the West's Cold War
5 R. Michael Berry, American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception (Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura, 1987), pp. 22-35.
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adversary? How accurate were their observations and assessments? Within 
that context can Finland be considered a special case?
This thesis will divide Finland's history between 1939 and 1955 into 
four time periods as they relate to different periods of portrayal in the Anglo- 
American press: 1.) the Winter War; 2.) the peace interlude and the 
Continuation War; 3.) the first phase of reconstruction between 1944 and 
1948; and 4.) Finland's successful survival and the establishment and 
acceptance of its neutrality. If one understands Finland's unique 
circumstances, then its resulting history, though nonetheless dramatic, is not 
as surprising as might at first be thought. The portrayal of Finland in the 
West was determined to a great extent by the state of relations between the 
United States and Great Britain on one hand, and the Soviet Union on the 
other. An attitude of sympathy, respect and admiration for the Finns, 
however, was often present. The United States and Great Britain, though on 
the same side during the Second World War and the Cold War, did not share 
identical views regarding Finland. The British had a significant economic 
interest in its relations with Finland in the postwar era. The United States, 
although very sympathetic to the plight of the Finnish people, readily 
accepted their location as outside its sphere of influence and left the Finns to 
face their fate in the postwar era as they had during the Winter War, alone.
II. THE WINTER WAR
The Northern summer light is amazingly 
beautiful and divine in its serenity- 
but the long winter night demands 
a price for it. Matti Klingi1
The Nordic nations are often referred to as lands of the midnight sun.
In the summer that is a true characterization, however, the geographic 
location that is responsible for the long summer nights also is responsible for 
a seasonal counterpart, winter days in which it is dark at midday. As autumn 
and winter approached in the fateful year of 1939, Europe was teetering on the 
edge of catastrophe. Finland, alone among the European democracies, was 
initially relieved by news of the pact between Hitler and Stalin. 
Understandably concerned about a conflict between the two diametrically 
opposed systems of Communism and Nazism, the Finns thought that the 
non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union would mean 
peace for Finland and the other Northern nations. The pact signed August 
23, 1939 in Moscow, however, set the stage for the invasion of Poland and the 
commencement of World War II and Finland was about to endure a 
seemingly endless winter night that was to last until the spring of 1945.
The Winter War lasted three and one half months, from November 
30, 1939 to mid-March 1940. The Soviets invaded after the Finns had refused 
to grant them all the territorial concessions they wanted. After they had 
made their pact with Hitler, the Soviets quickly concluded one-sided 
agreements with the Baltic nations . The Finns were more stubborn, even 1
1 Matti Klingi, Let Us Be Finns - Essays on History, (Helsinki: Otava, 1990), 57.
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though the Soviets offered to compensate them with land in northern 
Karelia. The Soviets argued that they needed Finnish territory to assure the 
safety of Leningrad and their positions in the Baltics. The Finns insisted that 
they posed no threat to the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed, but said that he was 
concerned about another power attacking the Soviet Union via Finnish 
territory. Stalin grew impatient and ordered an invasion that he had 
anticipated would be a short and sweet victory. He was proven wrong before 
the entire world. The Soviets, imitating Nazi methods, manufactured a 
border incident and then asserted that they had been attacked by Finland. A 
puppet government was installed in the small Finnish border town of 
Terijoki, headed by Otto Kuusinen, an exiled Finnish communist in Moscow 
who was a close adviser to Stalin.
The Winter War was big news, and while it lasted it was widely 
covered. Several common themes appeared in the Anglo-American press. 
Foremost was an almost universal sympathy and admiration for the Finns. 
The desperate struggle in the North was in striking contrast to the "Sitzkrieg" 
in Europe.2 Great Britain and the United States viewed the heroic Finns 
romantically. The British press presented the imagery of gallant "white 
knights" on skis and in addition the American press thought the Finns 
similar to Indians, both being of noble spirit and in harmony with nature. 
Two concurrent themes appeared regarding the Soviet Union vis-a-vis 
Finland: first, both stressed the bumbling incompetence of the Red army 
against the gallant Finns; the second theme, paradoxically, was the ominous 
specter of the mighty Moscow menace. The right and the left leaning press in 2
2 Many news agencies and periodicals transferred their top correspondents from the Western 
front in France to Finland, so that they could be where "the action was." Austin Goodrich, 
Study in Sisu, (New York: Ballantine, 1960), 56, commented that a high proportion of the 
press reports were inspired, written, edited and filed far behind the front lines "from the 
smoke filled cognac inundated bar of Helsinki's renowned Kamp Hotel."
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both Great Britain and the United States had surprisingly similar views 
regarding aid and outright intervention, but with significantly different 
motivations. Though no one supported the invasion of Finland, the left did 
not want to hinder the development of socialism in the Soviet Union, the 
right in America wished to keep America isolationist, while the right and 
moderate press in Great Britain wanted to take care of first things first, that is 
fight Germany singly, not in tandem with the Soviet Union, despite the 
justice of the Finnish cause.
Press Reactions to the War's Onset
While negotiations were being conducted in Moscow by Vainno 
Tanner, leader of the Social Democratic party, and Juho Paasikivi, a leading 
conservative who has been described as Finland's Churchill,3 to reach a 
peaceful solution, the press speculated on a Communist invasion.^ Both the 
Anglo and the American press predicted that in the event of a war, Finland 
would not receive any substantial material assistance. TheNation commented 
in November that the Finns realized if they were attacked, they would only 
receive moral support. The Economist stated that no one was willing or able to 
help Finland and considered it threatened in vacuo. Although Finland was 
deemed to be one of the most democratic communities the world had seen, 
and brought to mind the image of an Olympic runner or an honorable debtor, 
the Economist believed the Soviet Union required a base in Finland if it 
sought to protect its newly acquired Baltic bases.5 345
3 Fred Singleton, A Short History of Finland, (Cambridge, University Press, 1989), 101.
4 Vaino Tanner, The Winter War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), provides a first 
hand account of the political and diplomatic activities of the Finnish government 
immediately prior to and during the Winter War until the surrender.
5 "Communist Imperialism," Nation, 11 November 1939, 511, "Finland and Russia," 
Economist, 11 November 1939, 198-99. "Russia breaks with Finland," Manchester Guardian 
Weekly, 1 December 1939, noted that in event of war that "certainly the Western Powers 
would not intervene," as did other periodicals.
10
Mlap2. Finland in 1939
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After the Soviet invasion had begun, the Times (London), thoroughly
reflecting the bygone Victorian morality of the Nineteenth Century, criticized
the lack of Soviet sportsmanship, "hardly ever has a country been attacked
with such a brutal lack of consideration of the customary rules." The odds
against the "gallant" Finns were tremendous. The conflict, completely
manufactured by the Soviet Union, was either a blatant act of territorial
aggrandizement or implied a deep Soviet mistrust of the Nazis. In either
case, the Soviet propaganda created a "hysterical picture" of Goliath trembling
before David. The New Statesmen and Nation agreed with that analysis and
lamented, "We live in a jungle: there is nothing we can do about Finland."6
The Manchester Guardian Weekly thought the brutal war waged upon
the unprovocative, small and honest Finland by the Soviet Union was
"naked expediency, regardless of all right and wrong." Noting that Finland
was a favorite of the United States, the Economist hoped the invasion of
Finland would cause the United States to change its neutrality status. The
Economist clearly sympathized with the Finns, declaring,
In the magnitude of the odds they face, in their total 
innocence of any provocation, in the inherent 
superiority of their civilization over the tyranny they 
resist, the gallantry of the Finns exceeds anything in 
living memory and long before.6 7
A distinct discrepancy existed, however, between "heart" and "mind," as it 
would not be prudent for the Allies to help the Finns who must, however 
regrettably, fight alone. As the New Statesmen warned, "[o]n grounds of
6 Tzmes(London) 1 December 1939, "Russia's Patience," The New Statesmen and Nation , 2 
December 1939. Henceforth the latter periodical will be referred to simply as New 
Statesmen in the text and the Tzmes(London) will be referred to as the Times.
7 "The War on Finland," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 December 1939, 442, "Stalin's 
Aggression," Economist, 9 December 1939: 361-62.
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prudence alone, those who wish to turn this war into a crusade against 
Bolshevism are our worst enemies."8 9*
The American press' outrage against the Soviet Union exceeded that in 
Great Britain. The Minneapolis Morning Tribune asserted that the gulf between 
the Russian Communists and the German Nazis had long since been closed. 
The United States, however, could do little besides notifying the Soviets of 
American disapproval, argued the Tribune, and Americans should not trust 
their emotions to guide them in international policy. The Tribune warned of 
a serious danger: that America's "natural sympathy for Finland will 
precipitate some rash and impetuous act." Its editors feared that President 
Roosevelt was taking steps regarding Finland that jeopardized the United 
States' neutrality status?
The New Republic stated that there had never been a clearer case of 
unprovoked calculated aggression. Finland was a well-governed, intelligent 
nation admired by the world for its sturdy and progressive culture. The New 
Republic's cover page declared that Stalin had chosen the right course if he 
had wanted to unite the democratic and fascist capitalist powers against him. 
It alleged that many forces in Germany, Japan, France, Italy, the Vatican, the 
United States and Great Britain would love to see a crusade against 
Bolshevism. "American conservatives bear a hatred to the Soviet Union 
they never entertained toward Hitler and Germany." The United States' 
anger towards Russia and sympathy for Finland was real, but it would be a 
mistake to become involved in a world war.to
The left in both the United States and Great Britain was painfully 
disenchanted by Stalin's brutal power play. Freda Kirchwey, writer for the
8 "The Man of Steel," The New Statesmen and Nation, 9 December 1939, 811-812.
9 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, December 1939.
to "Stalin Spreads the War," The New Republic, 13 December 1939, 101:218-220.
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Nation, was a typical example. She criticized the Soviet's tactics, believing that 
they could have gotten their demands without war.u Letters to the New 
Statesmen reflected a similar opinion in Great Britain. One letter writer 
called upon all responsible individuals and groups on the left to condemn the 
Soviet invasion of Finland without exception, or else the cause of Socialism 
in Great Britain would be irreparably damaged. Another letter noted that 
1940 was to have seen not only the final payments of Finland's debt to the 
United States but the coming into operation of old-age and disability 
pensions. The frugal, honest, fearless, and hard working Finn, nevertheless, 
could be expected to endure their tribulation. A third writer asserted that the 
Russians "lacked essential Christian qualities" and thought the Russians 
probably lacked other less essential qualities as well. Such comments were 
not, however, left unanswered. One British defender of Stalin, judging the 
invasion depended on whether one wanted capitalism or Socialism to rule 
the world, wrote, "and I want Socialism." Another letter writer admitted that 
the invasion of Finland was morally indefensible and bitterly regretted, even 
by someone who considered himself a warm friend of the Soviet Union. He 
criticized the capitalist press, however, for being particularly anti-Soviet not 
pro-Finnish, correctly pointing out that the fate of Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia, 
Spain, or China all failed to receive the same unanimity of support.12 In 
observations such as this, one can see the genesis of the questions as to 
whether or not there was something inherently "special" about Finland.
At the outbreak of the Winter War the portrayal of Finland in the 
Anglo-American press was remarkably similar. Both the Anglo and the 12
11 Freda Kirchwey, "By Fire and Sword," Nation 9 December 1939, 149:639-40. She quoted 
the Volkischer Beobacter that gave the Nazi analysis of the Russo-Finnish War as "showing 
that collective security is ineffective in protecting the strong from the weak." See Ralph 
Bates, "Disasters in Finland," The New Republic, 13 December 1939, 221-225, as another 
example of a self-desribed radical who had become disenchanted with the Soviet Union.
12 "Correspondence," The Neiv Statesmen and Nation, December 1-31,1939.
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American press believed that America had a unique appreciation for Finland, 
a special relationship evolving out of debt repayment and democratic 
government. The image of "Honest Finland" was emphasized at the onset 
and evoked sympathy for this small nation.^ As the war passed through its 
opening stages, the image of "Valiant Finland" quickly developed to become 
the more dominant image evoking admiration in the Anglo-American press. 
Despite the almost universal sympathy for Finland, the press in neither 
America nor Great Britain anticipated assistance from the West for Finland. 
The left leaning segments of the press in both countries and America's 
isolationist press, furthermore, sought to prevent action that might lead to 
war with the Soviet Union.
Military Impressions and Analysis 
Without question, the most prominent military personality was 
Finland's top military commander Marshall Carl Gustav Mannerheim.
Before Finland's independence Mannerheim had been a Tsarist officer, 
fighting in the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I as a general. When 
the Russian Revolution occurred, he returned to Finland where he assumed 
command of the White forces and led them to victory in the Finnish Civil 
War.13 4 The defensive fortifications that stretched between the countless 
lakes and narrow passageways along Finland's Karelian isthmus became 
known as the Mannerheim line, and as long as it held, Finland was safe. The 
battle lines between Leningrad, and Finland's second city, Viipuri, were
13 During and after World War I the United States loaned $10 billion to European countries. 
With the exception of Finland, all the European countries defaulted on their debts and the 
financial burden fell upon the American taxpayer. See Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the 
Isolationists, 1932-45, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 81.
14 For further insights on Mannerheim and his eventful career, see Carl Gustav Mannerheim, 
The Memoirs of Marshall Mannerheim, translated by Eric Lewenhaupt (New York: Dutton, 
1954), Stig Jagerskiold, Mannerheim, Marshall of Finland, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1986), and J.E.O, Screen, Mannerheim, the Years of Preparation, (London: Hurst, 
1970).
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recognized as the front that would determine the outcome of the war. As 
news of lop-sided Finnish victories reached the world, the Finns were praised 
for their efficiency along with a corresponding tendency to describe the 
Soviets as bumbling incompetents.
The international community readily offered its moral and political
support to Finland. The Finnish delegate to the League of Nations argued
that was not enough, declaring that Finland needed,
more than tears and sympathy - she has shed enough tears 
of her own. . . We are fighting a battle for civilization and for 
the defense of the rights of man. We ask for the help of all 
men of goodwill. We can not defend the Finnish people 
against the bullets, shells and gas of our aggressors by mere 
international resolutions. If you help us all men will bless you 
as defenders of civilization.is
In the same issue of the Manchester Guardian Weekly that printed this appeal 
was an article headlined "Finland's Cause: Independence, Liberty and Honor." 
If the British government did not act to help Finland, it would not be due to 
the lack of press support. 16
The French were much more willing to go to Finland's aid than the 
British. Edouard Daladier, France's Prime Minister, had praised Finland as a 
noble country that was a crime victim. The greatness of a nation, he asserted, 
was not determined by the size of its territory but by "the valor of its sons and 
the degree of its civilization." As the Allies pursed the possibility of sending 
troops to aid Finland, the French government became increasingly frustrated 
by Sweden whose neutralism was attacked as reaching the depths of moral 
and material passivity. The Nation observed that the condemnations of the 
Soviet Union were in proportion to the denunciators distance from the 
Russian border. Hence, the South American nations were most vocal, while 156
15 "Finland and Russia," Manchester Guardian Weekly,15 December 1939.
16 "Finland and Russia," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 15 December 1939.
16
the European neutral nations were uneasily quiet, hoping to avoid a fate 
similar to Finland or Poland. 17
As the Finnish war dragged on, France and Great Britain became more 
and more upset by the dogged neutralism of Sweden and Norway. The Allies 
began to make preparations for an expeditionary force to be sent to Finland. 
Norway and Sweden, however, refused transit permission to the Allies. 
Sweden was the source of valuable iron ore for the Germans, and neither 
Sweden nor Norway wished to become a battle ground for four great powers: 
the Soviet Union, Germany, Great Britain and France. The Allies told 
Finland they would send relief forces if Finland made a formal request for 
soldiers. The Finns were painfully aware of the positions of the Norwegian 
and Swedish governments and realized the Allies were more interested in 
securing the Swedish iron ore deposits from Germany than in driving the 
Soviet army from Finland. Consequently, the Finns never made that formal 
request. If they had, one can only speculate on what the ramifications for the 
outcome of World War II would have been.
The Mannerheim line was, thought the Times, typical of the liberty 
loving Finns as in the past summer there was a spontaneous volunteer 
movement to construct the fortifications. The Finns were acknowledged to 
be well trained in tactics and athletics, primarily skiing. Finnish soldiers were 
likened at night to "white bats on skis." Noting the strong Finnish resistance, 
the Manchester Guardian Weekly thought that all available evidence 
confirmed the "first impressions of the Finns' efficiency and the Russians 
inefficiency. "18 *18
17 "France and Russia." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 15 January 1939, 471 and "French 
Criticism of Sweden," 26 January 1940, 66, "The Finns at Geneva," Nation, 16 December 1939, 
667-68.
18 Times (London), December 1-31, 1939, Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 1-29, 1939.
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By January, 1940, the press was speculating on the possibility of an 
actual Finnish victory. Some thought that if Finland received aid in time she 
could hold out, others thought a Russian victory was inevitable; all agreed, 
however, that without aid the Finns would lose. In February the Soviet 
pressure was showing signs of breaking through. Some of the early 
stereotypes of Russian incompetence, nonetheless, still remained. As the 
effectiveness of Soviet bombing increased, some reports speculated that the 
improved accuracy of Soviet bombing attacks was due to the planes being 
flown by German pilots. 19
The amazing Finnish victories, however, were recognized as mere 
breathing spells. Finland's hope, the Times observed, remained aid from 
abroad. The resources of human nerves were not unlimited, and the Finns 
were becoming strained. The Soviets were using fresh troops every day while 
the Finns were never relieved. What appeared impossible had come to pass, 
the Russians had suffered a definite reverse. The Finnish soldier had a high 
standard of training and valor and the natural defensive advantages of 
Finland would not have resulted in these victories without the men trained 
to take advantage of them. The Finnish tactics were thought brilliant: on the 
the Karelian Isthmus a rigid defense, elsewhere open warfare. The Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, had some praise for the Russian soldiers who were stubborn 
fighters but had the misfortune that their rulers, the Tsars and the 
Bolsheviks, sent them to fight with poor materials. The Guardian pleaded for 
help to be sent to Finland while their was still time.20
Throughout the Winter War the Anglo press cheered on the Finns in 
their early victories. Significant attention was given to the prospects of Allied 
intervention and the opinions of other European governments on the 1920
19 "Russia's Onslaught," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 9 February 1940, 101.
20 Times(London), December 1-31, 1939, Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 1-31, 1939.
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invasion of Finland were frequently reported. As the war progressed, the 
Anglo press quickly and repeatedly commented that time was against the 
Finns. The inability of the British government to decisively assist Finland 
lead to frustration in the moderate and conservative elements of the Anglo 
press.
The American press, as did the American people, reveled in the Finns 
successful defense of their country. The impression soon arose that Finns 
were not just successful because of superior tactics, but that they were 
successful because of superior character, intelligence, and capability. The war 
was described in the Minneapolis Morning Tribune as pitting Finland, a little 
nation of educated people in a self reliant democracy, against the illiterate 
hordes of the Soviet Union. A Tribune editorial mocked Soviet press reports 
that criticized the Finns for not fighting fairly as Finnish ski soldiers were 
camouflaged in white and attacked and withdrew quickly without waiting for 
a Soviet volley. The Finns were deemed to be putting up a beautiful defense 
that had the world's sympathy. The Tribune welcomed the Finns to fight 
anyway they pleased, and wished them well.21
Time and Newsweek discussed Finland every week during the war, and 
compared the Finns to American Indians resisting the expansion of the 
White man on the frontier. S. Fuqua, Newsweek's military editor, equated the 
Finnish ski cavalry assault tactics with the old Indian battle principle of 
scattering to march and assembling to fight. The Finnish attacks bore a 
striking similarity to the encircling maneuvers utilized by the Indians. These 
tactics, which required audacity, courage, and a touch of military genius to be 
successful, called for a deep drive by an advance guard to rush around the
21 Frederick Palmer, "Myth of Soviet's Military Might Jeopardized by the Finns," 
Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 7 December 1939, 14 "Unfair to Reds," Minneapolis Morning 
Tribune, 15 December 1939, 14.
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enemy and encircle him, taking any cover available. Both the Finns and the 
Indians, noted Fuqua, were renown for their scouting ability. Time stated that 
if the Mannerheim line was broken the Finns would be forced to "retire to 
their forests and fight for life like the Indians of North America."22 The 
ominous conclusion of either the Time or Newsweek analogy was that just as 
the North American Indians had been doomed to failure, so too were the 
Finns. Despite their skill and heroism the Indians could not offset the 
superior numbers and strength of their enemy, and the Finns could not 
continue to hold out against the weight of the Red army. In the case of 
Finland, all of America, hoping for a miraculous victory that one might 
expect from a Hollywood movie, was cheering for the "Indians."
Hannibal and Napoleon, observed Newsweek, with the best armies and 
generals of their times, were defeated in winter campaigns. Though the 
Soviets lacked such distinguished generalship, they had, nonetheless, 
managed (with Finnish help) to equal the disastrous results of Napoleon's 
and Hannibal's winter defeats. Journalists reported seeing the remains of a 
destroyed Soviet column stretching for four miles. New Soviet tactics of 
threatening the Finns on the front lines were mocked. Russian loudspeakers 
supposedly broadcast to the Finns on the Karelian front that if they did not 
surrender soon, they would have to fight the Germans.23 Such stories 
stressed the Red Army's inability to conduct an effective military campaign 
and its lack of confidence.
The American press continued to shower the Finnish soldier with 
praise. His battle performance, it was said, had "hardly been excelled in 
history, if it indeed has been equaled." It was supposedly impossible to find 23
22 S. Fuqua, "Indian Fighting on the Finnish Front," Newsweek, 15 January 1940, 22, 
"Northern Theater," Time 11 December 1940, 23-25.
23 "The Flying Finns," Newsweek 15 January 1940, 15;19-20, "Olga from the Volga,"
Newsweek 22 January 1940, 15:22-23.
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soldiers with better physiques anywhere in the world than these good athletes 
and marksmen who were virtually born on skis. Aside from their native 
intelligence, they were products of an excellent education system. These 
youthful looking soldiers loved to laugh. The great Finnish victory at 
Soumussalmi, in which two Red army divisions were destroyed, was held as 
a classic example of individual initiative: the Finnish division commander 
had issued only two written orders during the battle. The Finnish ski patrols 
of ten were said to attack up to 200 Russians, using knives for stealth and 
rifles only as a last resort.24
After the Winter War was over, the New Republic commented that the 
press in general had overplayed the weakness of the Soviet army. They were 
capable of defending Russia and they fought the war with their own weapons. 
While the world may not have held the Soviet weaponry in high regard, the 
Russians had been dependent upon the West for arms during World War I. 
This reflected a level of industrial achievement by the Soviets that had never 
been reached by the Tsars. Another disaster resembling the Finnish war, 
though, could possibly lead to the end of Stalin's government.25
The American press hoped for a Finnish victory and heaped extensive 
praise upon the Finnish soldiers and people. The dashing hit and run tactics 
of the mobile Finnish ski-troops were admired. The press, however, also 
reflected the reluctance of American neutralists and leftist to offer anything 
more than political and moral support.
During the course of the Winter War, the Anglo-American press went 
through a similar evolution of opinion concerning the military situation. At 245
24 Harold Denny, "The Men Who Fight for Finland," New York Times Magazine, 18 February 
1940, 3,22. "Northern Theater," Time 5 February 1940, 31 provides an example of Finnish 
humor during the Winter War: A Russian soldier knocks at heaven's gate and St. Peter opens 
the gate and asks, "So you're dead now?" "Oh, no," says the Russian, "according to the 
official communique, I'm still advancing on the Karelian Isthmus."
25 "How Strong is the Red Army," New Republic, 1 April 1940, 102:421.
21
first it was thought that Finland would be quickly taken over, then as the 
Finns succeeding in holding off the initial Soviet attacks, the press began to 
debate whether or not Finland might win. If it was possible that Finland 
could win, then the issue of how much to help Finland was raised. Despite 
sincere sympathy for the Finns, the press did not deem attempting to help 
Finland to be worth the cost. But the plight of the four million Finns, 
nevertheless, was prominently discussed, much more than Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, or the Baltics. The British wanted to focus on Nazi Germany 
and the United States wanted to stay out of any conflict, but in the 
justifications of their policies, both countries were defensive, as if they felt 
guilty over their actions.
Public Opinion
Both Great Britain and the United States witnessed a ground swell of 
public support for the "gallant" Finns who were making, the Times asserted, a 
stand against joint aggressors, Germany and the Soviet Union. The Sunday 
service at Westminster Abbey on December 17, 1939 featured special 
intercessions on behalf of Finland to the Almighty. Letters to the editors in 
both the United States and Great Britain reflected both an emotional and 
intelligent discourse on how to react to the plight of heroic Finland. The 
Times set the tone proclaiming that if Finland were saved, more than Finnish 
liberty would be preserved. "Her salvation would be a triumph for liberty 
which would re-echo throughout the World." Letters to the Times stressed 
the heroism of Finland, one stated that Finland's fight for freedom was 
showing the world that heroism could defeat masses and machinery.
Another reader predicted that if the Scandinavian nations did not ban
22
together they would be taken over by the Soviet Union one by one.26
Winston Churchill, while still First Lord of the Admiralty, stated in one of
his memorable radio broadcasts:
Only Finland, superb - nay sublime - in the jaws of peril, 
shows what free men can do. The service rendered by 
Finland to mankind is magnificent . . .  If the light of 
freedom which is still burning so brightly in the frozen 
North should be finally quenched it might herald a 
return to the Dark Ages.27
The British, however, were not about to become involved; they had 
their hands full already and they did not want to be taking on both the 
Germans and the Soviets. Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, 
had declared prior to Churchill's broadcast, that the primary objective of the 
allied war effort was "the defeat of Nazi Germany, we must never lose sight 
of that fact."28 A reader of the Manchester Guardian Weekly clearly disagreed, 
arguing that as the policeman of Europe, Great Britain ought to help Finland. 
"It makes no sense to fight only one gunman."29
With Christmas and the New Year arriving, several articles appeared 
discussing the Soviet bombing of Finnish civilians, as well as human interest 
stories about families separated by the war and the plight of children. The New 
Statesmen observed that Christmas time had also brought the rhetoric of a 
conflict between "Christian civilization" and totalitarianism. It warned 
against such tendencies, declaring that, "[t]o plunge the world into a new war 
of religions would be to destroy Christian civilization, not to save it." Stalin 
had abandoned the moral appeal of the Soviet Union and, commented the 26789
26 "Prayers at Abbey for Finland," Times (London)16 December 1939, "A Valiant 
Defense"Times (London) 28 December 1939.
27 "Churchill's Speech," Times(London) 22 December 1939.
28 "The War in Finland: Danger of Nazi-Soviet Coalition" Manchester Guardian Weekly ,22 
December 1939, 487, "Britain and Finland," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 22 December 1939, 
491.
29 "Help for Finland," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12 January 1940, 33.
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New Statesmen, he had made a common Marxist mistake when he invaded 
Finland, he had underrated nationalism.30 This analysis may indeed have 
had some merit as Stalin apparently believed that the workers of Finland 
would rise up and support the puppet government of Otto Kuusinen. The 
Finnish Communists, however, supported Finland and fought the Soviet 
Union side by side with their fellow countrymen of all political persuasions. 
Arvo Tuominen, Secretary General of the Finnish Communist Party, did not 
join the Terijoki government and ordered the tens of thousands of Finns that 
he held sway over in the party and in the trade unions to fight for Finland.31
The Anglo press revealed a split in British public opinion concerning 
the right course of action concerning Finland and the war with Germany. If 
morality were an issue, it was clearly on the side of Finland, but as Disraeli 
had said in the nineteenth century, politics is the art of the possible. A tug of 
war occurred between heart and mind, causing an uneasiness over Finland 
and reducing the confidence in Chamberlain's leadership even further.
With the exception of the far left, the hearts of America clearly 
supported the Finns. Surprisingly, a letter hostile to Finland found its way on 
the opinion page of the Minneapolis Morning Tribune. Lauri Jarvinen, a Finn 
who had immigrated to the United States because he did not like the Finnish 
government, alleged that Marshall Mannerheim and the rich landlords 
feared the poor, who were not adequately represented in Finland, and sought 
to keep them oppressed. Jarvinen quickly spurred a reply from another 
reader who classified Jarvinen's letter as Red propaganda. A third reader, 
much more typical, admired the spartan heroism of the noble and brave 
Finns who were rightly accorded the same honor as the heroes of 301
30 "The Frozen War," The New Statesmen and Nation, 30 December 1939, 945-946.
31 Arvo Tuominen, The Bells of the Kremlin: An Experience in Communism, (Hanover, NH: 
University Press of New England, 1983), 319-320.
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Thermopalae, "but," he added ominously, "those heroes were all slain." 
Commenting on the futility of Finland's resistance he concluded that the 
Soviets would conquer by sheer weight of numbers. Another reader, 
undoubtedly representing the Scandinavian influence in the upper Midwest 
described the Finns, along with the other Scandinavian peoples as being, 
"among the most friendly, kindly, intelligent and honorable of the races 
inhabiting the earth."32 Similar characterizations of the Russians, Slavic 
Communists, were not to be seen.
While the Allies were trying to decide what to do for Finland, press 
coverage continued to evoke sympathy for Finland and anger towards the 
Soviet Union. The attack on Finland was compared to the image of a rape. 
Finland's geographical representation on a map was observed to suggest the 
figure of a full skirted woman - perhaps maimed by a beast, who held aloft the 
stumps of her arms in supplication for deliverance from her savage foe. The 
Minneapolis Morning Tribune argued further that the Soviet invasion of 
Finland was an indefensible act of aggression, even if George Bernard Shaw 
had defended the invasion because of Soviet security concerns. Referring to 
both their debt payment record and their resistance, the Tribune editorialized 
that the heroic Finns had put greater nations to shame.33
Since Finland was showing itself to be such an exceptional country, the 
press needed an exceptional word to describe it, and the Finnish language just 
happened to contain such a word, sisu. Hudson Strode wrote a feature story 
on sisu in the New York Times Magazine. He observed that more attention had 
been paid to Finland in the last three months than in the previous nineteen 
centuries, and he was not far from the truth. Sisu is an uniquely Finnish 
word that has no precise equivalent in any other language and eludes 32
32 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, December 1-31, 1939.
33 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, December 1-31, 1939.
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definition. If one could understand sisu, one could grasp how the Finns had 
so gallantly withstood the Soviet onslaught. Paavo Nurmi, the world 
champion runner defined sisu as "patience and strong will without passion." 
Sisu connotates tenacity, endurance, guts, and unwavering determination. 
The Finns, thought Strode, had a fresh, primitive side that was unspoiled and 
in close harmony with nature. The Finns were described as being without 
selfishness, pettiness, or meanness despite their spartan qualities. Strode 
stated that the Finns believe that "pity never harmed a man except when he 
pities himself." The real religion of the Finns was patriotism and a passion 
for self improvement, hence they did not fear death or destruction, as Spirit 
was life's only significant reality.34
As public support for assistance appeared to grow in early 1940, the 
press took a harder look at Finland. The New Statesmen asked if Finland was 
a democracy. There was a long standing charge of pro-German sentiment in 
the Finnish military, particularly among the officer corps.35 All over the 
world, commented the New Republic, army officers develop a psychology 
closely akin to fascism.36 The West could remain assured, however, that the 
Finns feared and hated both the Germans and the Russians. Finland was an 
orderly democracy, albeit not as exalted as some supporters of Finland 3456
34 Hudson Strode, "Sisu: A Word that Explains Finland," New York Times Magazine, 14 
January 1940, 6-7. For a deeper examination of the spiritual aspects of the Finnish character 
see Matti Klingi, "Aspects of the Nordic Self" in Matti Klingi Let Us Be Finns - Essays on 
History.
35 This dated back to the ]ager movement when 2,000 Finns went to Germany in 1915 to 
receive military training. Motivated by a nationalistic desire for independence, they were 
essential to the White's victory in the Finnish Civil War and were predisposed to view 
Russia as Finland's principal enemy.
36 The Lapua Movement in Finland from 1929 through 1932 was a vocal and visible right- 
wing movement. Encouraged by the rural clergy and some banking interests, the Lapua 
movement sought and obtained the exclusion of the communist party from political activity. 
They were suppressed after they attempted to have the Social Democratic party banned as 
well. The Lapua Movement reappered under the banner of the People's Patriotic Movement 
(IKL) but never obtained more than 14 seats out of the 200 in the Finnish Parlilament. See 
Fred Singleton, A Short History of Finland, 121-123 and John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 241-242, 251-252.
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claimed, with significant progressive legislation.37 The left which had looked 
to the Soviet Union for the model of a perfect society, actually saw much that 
it approved of in Finland's society.
The British press disapproved of America's neutrality policy. The 
Economist in particular had an ax to grind, criticizing America for not offering 
military aid to "Valiant Finland." It asserted that America's foreign policy 
was dictated by fear of war, making references to "America's Munich." The 
New Statesmen criticized America's policy for doing too much, judging it to be 
based on dislike and fear of Russia in addition to a special sympathy for 
Finland. President Roosevelt had declared a "moral embargo" on arm sales 
to the Soviet Union two days after it had invaded Finland but had waited a 
whole year to apply such an embargo after Japan had invaded China. 
Propagandist of the "Moscow menace" were not considered warmongers. 
Disapproval over America's neutrality policy was also expressed in the 
United States. The New Republic worried that the feeling in America for 
Finland was being exploited to condition Americans to view Moscow as their 
enemy. The isolationist press in America was also uncomfortable with the 
"moral embargo." The Minneapolis Morning Tribune, commented that 
although the moral embargo was easily understandable, it was a violation of 
America's neutrality, both laws and principle.38
The press in both countries began to emphasize that time was against 
Finland. Unless the West were to send help quickly, Finland's defeat was 
inevitable. A New York Times editorial pessimistically spoke of the "fate of a 
race" stating the fate of the Finns in Karelia was a grim lesson for those Finns 
who were still desperately fighting. Pressure to give military aid to the Finns 378
37 "Is Finland a Democracy?" The New Republic, 29 January 1940, 102: 135-136.
38 "America's Munich," Economist 20 January 1940, 96, Barbara Wertheim, "The United 
States and Finland," The New Statesmen and Nation, 20 January 1940, 68-69, "Neutrality 
Cross-Currents," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 28 December 1939, 4.
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continued in late February and early March 1940 up until the end of the war 
on March 12.39 John Dingel, a Representative from Michigan, a state with 
several Finnish communities criticized an aid bill for Finland that was 
granting only non-military supplies because of the restrictions of the 
Neutrality Acts. "We know," he declared, "the Finns need shrapnel, 
buckshot, barbed wire, and all the fiercest implements of hell because they are 
fighting to stop anti-Christ and the hosts of hell lead by Beelzebub."40 Yet 
supporters of the left also remained vigilant, though a distinct minority. A 
letter to the Manchester Guardian Weekly from the Fabians George Bernard 
Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb argued against assisting Finland. They 
stated that the British Empire should not attack the Soviet Union as it was 
not only wrong but militarily doomed to failure.41
In the Anglo-American press the neutrality of the American 
government and the actions of the British government were subject to much 
debate and criticism. The implication of the press coverage of public opinion 
was that the moral response would be to help Finland but that the expedient 
response was to avoid the military involvement that would be required to 
save Finland. The Finnish people, nonetheless, continued to be portrayed as 
a sturdy, stout, and brave lot who had a seemingly endless supply of sisu. 
Letters to the editor sections of periodicals were overwhelmingly sympathetic 
with the Finns. Editorials, while condemning the Soviet invasion, frequently 
urged caution. Though neutral in deed, the Anglo-American press did not 
want to be considered neutral in thought. 39401
39 Leland Stow, "Time Against Finland," 17 February 1940, 243-44, "Fate of a Race," New 
York Times, 26 February 1940, 14.
40 "For Finland," Time, 11 March 1940, 35:16-17.
41 "Allies and Russia: the Incalculable Risks of a War," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 
March 1940, 198.
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End of the Winter War
As the Winter War concluded, the press spoke of the futility of 
Finland's resistance, debated whether or not Finland could have been helped, 
and placed blame on those most responsible for Finland's fate. Universally, 
the press regretted the harshness of the terms imposed upon Finland, but 
there was also a sense of relief that the Finland's trial was over. After the 
"Phony War" came to an end in western Europe in May, 1940, however, little 
attention was paid to the work of Finnish reconstruction and the resettlement 
of the Karelian refugees. With the fall of France and the beginning of the 
Battle of Britain, Finland quickly became an old story. The realities of power 
politics in the twentieth century came home to roost; great powers did not 
have time to concern themselves with the fate of one of the many defeated 
small powers of Europe.
The Manchester Guardian Weekly believed that Finland and Great 
Britain shared, in principle, the same cause. It lamented, "We feel that once 
again we have not been able to save those whom somehow we should have 
saved." Difficult times were still ahead for the British people and they saw 
Finland as one more nation to fall victim to aggression without help. Letters 
to the Times praised the "Spirit of Finland." One reader viewed the defense 
of Finland as "the most heartening thing in modern history." Another 
reader believed that Great Britain owed another debt to Finland, for her 
realistic view of the war situation had prevented her from formally 
requesting British aid, which would have been disastrous.42
The Minneapolis Tribune was again representative of the press in its
assessment of realpolitik in the twentieth century, "[t]here is little spirit of
knight errantry in modern warfare, as plucky Finland, fighting to exhaustion, *31
42 "Debate on Finland," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 22 March 1940,Times (London) March 1 -
31, 1940.
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must have realized long ago." Finland had gone down forsaken by her fellow 
democracies and was destined to be an economic satellite of the Nazi-Soviet 
Axis. Finland would cease, therefore, to posses real independence for the 
duration of the war. The Soviets might regret, the Tribune predicted, 
preventing Norway, Sweden and Finland from forming a defensive alliance. 
If Germany was to attack Scandinavia, the Soviets would have to blame 
themselves.43 This was an interesting observation for the Nazis might have 
had a difficult time taking over Finland, Sweden, and Norway 
simultaneously. Whether this would have deterred Hitler, however, who 
went on to invade the Soviet Union and declare war on the United States, is 
doubtful. The issue as to whether Finland was a German satellite or an 
independent nation was to be of crucial importance for Finland in the Anglo- 
American press and its relations with Great Britain and the United States 
during the Continuation War.
George Soule asked a painful question in the New Republic. Who got 
anything from the war commensurate with their sacrifice? Certainly not the 
Finns, who earned the admiration of the world for their skills and courage 
but had been forced to accept worse terms than the Soviets had requested 
before the war began. Soule thought that if France and Great Britain had 
intervened four of the worlds most precious cultures would have been 
destroyed, as Germany would have invaded the North to protect its supply of 
raw materials from Sweden. The Nation condemned the Soviet Union as the 
aggressor and ridiculed their tactics. The British government was said to bear 
a high responsibility for Finland's defeat, avoiding conflict with the Soviet 
Union in a hope to split them from the Nazis. Norway and Sweden,
43 Minneapolis Morning Tribune, March 1-31, 1940.
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however, were held to have the greatest responsibility for Finland's defeat, 
and, it was held, they may have cause to regret it.44 45
The New York Times did bring attention to the rebuilding of postwar 
Finland, commenting that the problems of reconstruction were almost more 
difficult than the war and seemingly as hopeless. The Finns had to build 
housing for 500,000 refugees from the ceded territories, as less than one 
percent of those living there chose to remain under Soviet rule. The New 
York Times predicted a dynamo of activity in Finland to tackle the problems of 
peace. The Finns were praised for the one time capital levy that was raised in 
their country to pay for reconstruction and spare future generations from 
back-breaking taxation. The New York Times expressed a sense of guilt over 
the blockade of Europe by the British that was affecting the Finns. It 
editorialized, "[t]he democratic world would have an easier conscience," if 
somehow Finland could be helped in her present battle against starvation and 
isolation.45 Unfortunately, despite the best of intentions, Finland was to 
remain isolated and alone for a long time to come. Winter had not yet 
exacted its final price.
Summation
The Winter War created the image "Valiant Finland" and etched it 
quite firmly in the Anglo-American press. Finland was considered to be part 
of a common heritage shared by Western Civilizations. The two most often 
emphasized characteristics of this civilization were democracy and 
Christianity. Finland's image was enhanced by the general revulsion in the 
Anglo-American press towards the Soviet Union. But Finland's popularity
44 George Soule, "The War Nobody Won," New Republic, 25 March 1940, 102:306-307, Robert 
Dell, "Why Finland Lost," Nation , 23 March 1940, 385-87.
45 New York Times, March-December 1940.
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was not due exclusively to anti-Soviet sentiment. The Finns' rugged 
individualism on the battlefront appealed to traditional American values, 
and the British appreciated the Finns' stiff upper-lip. Despite all the sympathy 
for Finland, no significant help was given, except by Sweden.46 Though 
Finland was lauded as an outpost of Western Civilization, realpolitik and 
national interest took precedence over idealism in the responses of both the 
United States and Great Britain .47 Churchill had proclaimed that Finland
showed "what free men could do," but the few nations that could rightly be 
considered free decided to do nothing. After Finland's defeat, the press 
seemed to stress the inevitability of Finland's defeat to excuse the lack of 
action by the Allies. The futility of Finland's resistance served to enhance the 
romantic image of "Valiant Finland." The Winter War was to create a 
substantial reservoir of good will for Finland, but the events of World War II 
were once again to isolate Finland from the West causing confusion and 
mixed sympathies among the British, Americans, and Finns, not to mention 
the Soviet Union and Germany.
46 Sweden allowed 8,000 volunteers to take "leave" from the Swedish Army and sent much 
arms and ammunition, leaving its own stocks uncomfortably low. See Franklin Scott,
Sweden: The Nations History, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 504.
47 Not until the middle of 1940 did isolationism lose its majority position in American 
public opinion. After October 1940, a majority of the American people thought giving aid to 
Great Britain was more important to the national interest then avoiding war. See Wayne 
Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, 363.
III. THE CONTINUATION WAR 
JUNE 1941-SEPTEMBER 1944
[H]ow we live is so far removed from 
how we ought to live, that he who 
abandons what is done for what ought 
to be done, will rather bring about his 
own ruin than his preservation.
Niccolo Machiavelli1
On the morning of June 22, 1941 operation Barbarossa began when the 
Germans launched a massive Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. The 
invasion was a clear turning point, perhaps the turning point, in the Second 
World War. Despite amazing early victories over the Red Army, the Nazi 
war machine had bitten off more than it could chew. The German invasion 
of the Soviet Union created significant dilemmas for Finland. When the 
invasion began, Finland vainly tried to maintain her neutrality, but neither 
the Soviet Union nor Germany observed it. Finland attempted to maintain 
its neutrality until June 25, 1941, when, after several attacks by the Soviet 
Union, Finland officially entered the war. Caught between Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union, Finland struggled to maintain its independence. The 
state of Great Power relations forced the reluctant Finns to go to war against 
the Soviet Union again, this time as a de facto ally of Nazi Germany.
During the three years and three months until the Soviet-Finnish 
armistice in September of 1944, Finland entered into a very complicated and 
perilous diplomatic and political situation on top of her military concerns. 1




The Finns maintained they were waging a defensive struggle, seeking only to 
regain the territory lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War. Even the 
name "Continuation War" is controversial since it may indicate an 
acceptance of the official Finnish view. Throughout the course of the entire 
war, the Finnish government held that their conflict was a continuation of 
the Winter War and separate from, albeit simultaneous with, the German 
invasion. As the war progressed this position became increasingly 
unacceptable to both the Allies and the Germans. In December, 1941, Great 
Britain, under pressure from the Soviet Union, declared war on Finland. The 
United States, however, chose to remain officially at peace with Finland for 
the duration of World War II, though diplomatic relations with Finland 
became quite strained. As a co-belligerent of Germany against the Soviet 
Union, Finland could hinder American and British interests. In the middle 
of 1944 it appeared that Finland might not be able to escape from her 
precarious situation intact as a nation. Caught between the interests of great 
powers, she was unable to exit a war she had not wanted to fight.
The degree of Finnish participation and cooperation with the Germans 
in Operation Barbarossa is a controversial issue. The Germans exploited a 
troop transit agreement with Finland in order to place five divisions in 
Finnish territory to participate in Barbarossa.2 Finland and Germany posed a 
threat to two strategic concerns of the Soviet Union and the Allies: the 
Murmansk-Leningrad railway that tunneled Lend-lease aid into the Soviet 
Union, and Leningrad itself. Neither was captured by the Finns, who stopped 
their advance into Soviet territory in late December 1941 slightly beyond their
2 On September 22, 1940 an agreement was formalized in Berlin providing for the transport 
of men and material for the Luftwaffe from the Finnish ports of Vaasa and Oulu via 
Rovaniemi to the German base at Kirkenes in Norway. The Finnish Parliament was not 
consulted at any time during the negotiations. See Charles Lundin, Finland in the Second 
World War, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957) 88-90.
34
1939 border. The Finnish battle lines changed little until the Soviets counter 
attacked in June 1944. Mannerheim was elected President on August 4, 1944 
and an armistice was declared on September 5, 1944. Throughout the 
Continuation War Finland maintained a delicate balancing act. Finland had 
to do enough to placate Germany and thereby receive economic aid, but it 
could not afford to seriously threaten Soviet interests.
Berry argues that the positive Finnish image was not tarnished as 
much as the logic of Great Power politics might suggest .3 During the 
Continuation War Finland's coverage in the Anglo-American press was 
more sporadic than it was during the Winter War, but much more critical. 
The Anglo-American press expressed divergent views and explanations of 
Finland's participation in the war. When the invasion of the Soviet Union 
began both the Anglo and the American press expressed some sympathy for 
Finland's desire to regain lost territory. The press also expressed an 
appreciation for Finland's difficult geographical and political situation.
The Anglo-American press grew more and more critical of Finland 
after her army advanced past the pre-Winter War border in September, 1941.3 4 
The British, who were officially at war with Finland, became especially 
merciless towards Finland, holding it responsible for its own position as it 
tried to exit from the war. Views towards the Finnish people changed from 
the Winter War, as the Finns were thought to be a small nation caught up in 
their own petty concerns unable to see the big picture of World War II. Yet 
how could this be for the gallant people who had just sixteen months before 
had been the outpost of Western civilization? This problem was solved in 
the Anglo and American press to a certain extent by differentiating between
3 R. Michael Berry, American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception, 175.
4 See Carl Gustav Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshall Mannerheim, 426-28; Charles 
Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, 152-53. The Finns moved here to establish a 
shorter, more defensible frontline.
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Map 3. Farthest Finnish Advance into the Soviet Union 
December, 1941
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the Finnish people and their government which was portrayed as not acting 
in the best interests of their people.5 The Finnish government was thought 
to have time and time again bumbled opportunities to exit from the war.
Opinions in the Anglo and American press differed on the grounds for 
Finland's withdrawal. The press in both countries recognized, however, that 
the Finns hoped for mediation on their behalf by the United States and Great 
Britain with the Soviet Union. As it had during the Winter War, the United 
States offered its “good offices" to bring the Soviet Union and Finland to the 
peace table, but the United States did not (and could not) provide Finland 
with any concrete guarantees. Though both the United States and Great 
Britain hoped that Finland would obtain a separate peace, neither was willing 
to jeopardize their relationship with the Soviet Union.
Anglo Press Opinion
The Anglo press made it clear it would neither tolerate nor excuse any 
nation's actions that would make the defeat of Nazi Germany more difficult. 
The week of the invasion of Russia, the Economist admitted that it was 
natural that Finland should want to be rid of Russia. Finland had been 
warned, however, of Great Britain's resolve to fight Germany, and Finland 
must bear the consequences. The Economist contended that Finland was no 
longer an independent country. In November it urged the British 
government to declare war on Hungary, Rumania and Finland. The decision 
to declare war on Finland was not without regret and hesitation. To the
5 Ernst von Born, a Swedish-Finn cabinet member, expressed concern over the Finnish 
governments' policy of seizing Soviet territory. In an interview with a Swedish journal that 
was never released by Finnish censors, he spoke of the stone that had marked the Finnish- 
Russian border for over three hundred years. "Into it are chiseled the words: 'Gustavus 
Adolphus King of Sweden, established the farthest boundary of the country here. With 
God's help may the boundary last.' If we go across this boundary, I am afraid that Gods's 
help will no longer be with us. See Charles Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, 140- 
41.
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Economist the Finns were a gallant people who were unfortunately blinded by 
a hatred of Russia. Finland's dilemma, the Economist insisted, was of its own 
making.6
In September of 1941 the Manchester Guardian Weekly gave a running 
coverage of Finland's position in the war. The Finns by then had nearly 
recovered all their lost territory, as though, observed the Guardian, the 
Russians had given it to them. This appearance caused speculation on the 
prospects for a separate peace. The Finns described as "that fine race which 
lost too many of its men" in its previous war with Russia, were thought to 
desire a separate peace. The Germans, however, were anticipated to do all 
they could to prevent it. The Guardian did not relish the prospect of war with 
Finland stating that Great Britain "would like to see Finland cease to be the 
friend of its enemy," before circumstances might make her an actual enemy.
If Finland continued its war, the Guardian concluded, Finland would be 
fighting for Hitler's victory and the defeat not only of Russia but Britain and 
her Allies. They would be fighting for the destruction of liberty and bear the 
moral responsibility of the aggressor powers. The Finnish situation was held 
to be a tragedy for the hard working Finnish people, but nevertheless, if 
Finland continued to fight the Soviet Union then she was Britain's enemy.6 7
In December the Times noted that Great Britain would reluctantly 
declare war on Finland, after trying to avoid it for several weeks. Finnish 
policy forced Great Britain's decision. While it was understandable that 
Finland wanted its lost territory back, the Times criticized the Finns for not 
trying diplomatic means. They contacted neither London nor Washington 
before advancing past their old frontiers into the Soviet Union. The Finns,
6 "Right About Turn," Economist 28 June 1941, 841-44, and "Hitler's Mercenaries" Economist 
8 November 1941, 560.
7 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 5, 12, and 19 September 1941.
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feared the Times, may have been deceived as the Germans did not care for 
Finnish rights, just their military support.8 9
The Anglo press reported on living conditions within Finland during 
the war and presented a rather bleak picture. It also commented that the 
Finnish people wanted peace. The Times reported increasing food shortages 
and a rise in infant mortality rates. British Commando raids in Norway 
created anxiety in Finland, alleged the Times, by increasing speculation of a 
joint Anglo-Soviet invasion.9
Germany's economic stranglehold on Finland was readily recognized. 
The Economist assessed that Germany's greatest weapon in influencing 
Finland was her economic supremacy. Conditions within Finland were 
deteriorating as the war progressed. The Manchester Guardian Weekly was 
sympathetic towards the Finnish people who had been among the best fed 
peoples of Europe prior to World War II but were now in a state of semi­
starvation. Germany was said to have robbed Finland of her political 
independence and exploited her economically with unfavorable terms of 
trade causing an increase in inflation already fueled by a labor shortage.10
The Times, though supportive of a hard line towards Finland, 
recognized that Finland was unlike the Nazi vassals across Europe from 
Vichy to Bulgaria. The leaders of all countries that were allies or co­
belligerents of Germany, except for Finland, had gone to Bertchesgarden to 
meet with Hitler. Reports alleged both President Ryti and Marshall 
Mannerheim had refused to go. The Finns were not willing to step up their 
war effort for Germany, the Times believed, for if they had, the Finns certainly
8 "Zero Hour Near for Finns" Times(London) 1 December 1941, 3 & "British Warning Ignored, 
Finns Still Silent" 5 December 1941, 4.
9 "Uneasy Days in Finland, Belated Peace Efforts," Times(London) 14 January 1942, 3.
10 "The Misery of Finland," Manchester Guardian Weekly , 29 May 1942, 324.
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would have recalled soldiers to the front who had been released to work in 
the fields and factories. Furthermore, asserted the Times, the Finns clearly 
recognized that the war was lost.11 In fact, by the time of the German 
surrender at Stalingrad, the Finns realized that the war had turned against 
Germany. The next day, February 3, 1943, a conference was held at 
Mannerheim's headquarters between him and leaders of the civilian 
government and they concluded that Finland should get out of the war as 
soon as possible. At that time, however, the Finns judged Germany still 
strong enough to prevent Finland from quitting the war.1 2
At the Casablanca conference in January, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill 
met with their combined Joint Chiefs of Staff. To reassure Stalin, who was 
suspicious of the British and Americans cutting a deal with Germany behind 
his back, Roosevelt declared that the war would only end with the 
unconditional surrender of all enemies. This declaration was aimed directly 
at Hitler and Churchill readily accepted it. But did this mean that Finland too 
must surrender unconditionally? The Anglo and American press were to 
disagree on this point. The decision to pursue unconditional surrender 
unexpectedly gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to control Eastern 
Europe; as the Red Army marched all the way to Berlin they created 
Communist governments in the countries they liberated.13 Finland, 
however, was able to avoid this "liberation."
By February, 1944, the Economist thought the Casablanca formula 
applied to Finland. The Soviet Union, therefore, had the right to demand 
nothing less than Finland's unconditional surrender. Finland was the only
11 "Finland Holds Back," Times(London), 6 May 1943,3.
12 Carl Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, 460-61, and Charles Lundin, 
Finland in the Second World War, 175-176.
13 George Brown Tindall and David Shi, America: A Narrative History, (New York: Norton, 
1992), 1192.
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axis country in which war against the Soviet Union was backed by democratic 
public opinion. This was a fatal mistake, the people's patriotic and democratic 
sin. War is indivisible, the Economist argued, and Finland's war merged with 
Germany's. Nonetheless, a continued war with a harsh peace settlement 
would be a "heaven sent gift to the Nazis." The Economist thought it was 
vital that the Russian occupation of Finland, which it thought to be 
inevitable, not make the Finns feel they had lost their independence.*4 The 
Soviet demands on Finland, deemed the Economist, were much less than the 
Allies surrender demands on Italy, yet the negotiations were unexpectedly
protracted.*5
After the Soviet Union and Finland finally agreed to an armistice, the 
Economist commented on the severity of Finland's reparations. It noted 
Finland would have to hand over its export surplus for the next thirty-three 
years. If that were to be the case Finland would be unable to import 
necessities for the maintenance, let alone expansion of agriculture and 
industry. To survive Finland would require loans or credits from the West.16 
This obvious dependence on future assistance from the West caused the 
Economist to describe the logic of Finland's behavior, which was thought to be 
strikingly "unrepentant," as a diplomatic puzzle. Finland was being treated 
with real generosity by the Soviet Union considering the Finns had 
continued to fight as long as they thought that Germany could win.17
The Manchester Guardian Weekly stated in March, 1944, that the 
difficulties the Finns were experiencing as they tried to exit from the war were 
created by "themselves when they chose to ride the Nazi tiger." In June the *156
*4 "Russia and Finland," Economist 19 February 1944, 233-34.
15 "Finland and Italy," Economist 11 March 1944, 332.
16 "Reparations," Economist 2 September 1944, 314.
17 "The Unrepentant Satellite," Economist 9 September 1944, 345.
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Guardian reiterated its position that Finland had not chosen wisely and now 
had to pay the price. "The Finnish government backed the wrong horse as 
lamentable as any punter in history. "18 After the Soviets and Finns agreed to 
an armistice in September 1944, the Times indicated the Finns had been more 
fortunate than they perhaps deserved. It commented that the Finns had 
managed to obtain much less onerous terms than they had been offered in 
March, despite the losses the Finns had inflicted on "our Russian Ally and 
help given to our German enemy." The armistice terms and treatment of 
Finland, thought the Times, showed that Stalin was making good on his 
assurances to Great Britain and the United States not to overthrow the 
existing social and economic structures of Eastern Europe. Finland, however, 
was to prove to be the exception, not the rule of Stalin's policy in Eastern 
Europe as the Red Army created the iron curtain. The Times also expressed a 
high regard for the Finnish people stating there was reason to hope that 
Finnish dourness, industry and resourcefulness would be able to overcome 
the difficulties.19
Although Finland was no longer portrayed in the Anglo press as the 
defender of Christian and, hence, Western civilization, there remained a 
common theme from the Winter War. The British priority was to secure the 
defeat of Nazi Germany and nothing else was to interfere with the pursuit of 
that goal. Finland's position was regrettable, but the Finns had to take 
responsibility for themselves and their own actions. Likewise, the British had 
to take care of themselves, and were doing so.
18 Manchester Guardian Weekly , 3 March 1944, 113 and 23 June 1944, 335.
19 "Terms for Finland," T;mes(London), 20 September 1944, 5.
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American Press Opinion
After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941 a Minneapolis 
Morning Tribune editorial defended the Finnish position. Finland was said to 
be between the devil and the deep blue sea and that Finland was certain to 
have been invaded by either the Soviet Union or Germany. Unlike the 
United States, the Tribune observed, neutrality for Finland was out of the 
question. If the United States justified aiding Stalin because he was deemed 
to be the lesser menace, the Tribune stated, "we should allow the Finns to 
make the same judgment." It thought that both Finland and the United 
States were holding their noses and were following the course that each had 
determined to be in their national interest.20
Finland's war aims, thought Time, were uncomplicated. The Finns war 
with Russia was a private war: the Finns sought a more defensible eastern 
boundary, and wanted Russia to pay for her 1939 attack. Time reported, 
however, the rumor that the Nazis had taken over the Finnish government. 
In October 1941 Time reported Prince Gustaf Adolph of Sweden's tour of the 
Russo-Finnish front. The prince, asserted Time, could see that the Finns were 
fighting for race and nation. As the namesake of the great Gustavus 
Adolphus II, the Swedish prince was to know the feeling of the north 
countryman for the Slavs. The Finns considered themselves Nordics, stated 
Time, while the Nazis were "bogus Nordics." Surprisingly racist in its 
overtones, Time noted that shells had sailed over Prince Gustav's head at the 
front, "and behind him blond men were killed. Yes, he understood why 
Finns fought."21 Apparently, Time understood too. 201
20 "The Case of Finland," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 30 June 1941, 4.
21 "Uncomplicated War Aims," Time 4 August 1941, 32, "Why Finns Fight," Time, 20 October 
1941, 29.
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I. F. Stone, a left-wing writer, criticized Finland and the Unites States' 
policy towards her. In the Nation he declared that the United States should 
take a hard line while Great Britain should declare war on Finland. Both, 
thought Stone, had been too dilatory regarding the Finnish government, 
which was described as having turned a cold shoulder to peace proposals. The 
Finnish people themselves, Stone stated, were denied access to the truth. He 
charged that the Finns had severed the Murmansk-Leningrad railway and 
that Mannerheim was a fascist and a German sympathizer.2 2  Concerns over 
Russian supply lines and fascist tendencies in Finland were to have a 
detrimental effect on Finland's image in the United States during the 
Continuation War.
The Nation continued to criticize Finnish policies. Maurice Feldman 
alleged that Finland was governed by a military dictatorship entirely under 
German control. Feldman stated drastic changes in Finnish political life had 
not been noticed abroad. Foreign trade to Finland had been cut off by the 
Nazis. Power had supposedly shifted from the Diet to the Army General Staff 
so that Mannerheim and his officers were the rulers of Finland. Feldman 
reported that 85 percent of the Finnish officer corps had belonged to the "Nazi 
Lapua movement."23
In May 1942, the New York Times suggested that unrest was stirring in 
Finland and other East European countries. The counselor of the Finnish 
legation promptly responded. He stated in a letter to the editor that since 
Russia was aligned with the West, Finland did not see the World War as 
being for or against democracy. He restated Tanner's statement of Finland's 
war aims as being only freedom and defense of democracy. The Finns 
thought peace to be possible only if the Soviet system collapsed or a general 23
22 I. F. Stone, "Fumbles for Finland," Nation, 15 November 1941, 475-76.
23 Maurice Feldman, "Changes in Finland," Nation 21 March 1942, 339-40.
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world peace was restored. This position was quickly attacked by another letter 
to the editor. The writer asserted that the fact was that the Finns hated too 
well, and that they hated the Russians more than the issues the rest of the 
world was fighting for. The writer considered Finland an "unfortunate 
nation" but considered her efforts to be pointless.24 25
In June, 1942, Marshall Mannerheim had his seventy-fifth birthday and 
was visited in Finland by a surprise guest, Adolph Hitler. This "unwelcome 
surprise," Time noted, was not mentioned on Finnish radio. Speculation 
throughout the Allied nations was that undoubtedly this visit was to request 
Finnish participation in a new offensive against Leningrad, the Murmansk 
railway or both. If the Finns were to co-operate with Hitler, Time warned that 
they may have the unwelcome surprise of war with their one time best 
friend, the United States.25
The American press began to comment on the suffering the Finns were 
enduring, and how the common people longed for an end to the war. A New 
York Times editorial described Finland as war weary and suffering from 
intense inflation that had caused the quintupling of land prices since the war 
began. The economic consequences were being felt in every family as the 
Finns were reported to be wearing cardboard shoes. The acute manpower 
shortage was hindering the conversion to a war economy. Newsweek stated 
that "thankless years of German cold and hunger" were visible in the faces of 
the 3.8 million Finns. The food shortage was supposedly so severe that the 
17,000 Soviet POWs had died as a result. Newsweek did not accept Finland's
24 "Spring Reinvigorates Finns" New York Times 14 May 1942, p6 and 16 May 1942, p8.
25 "Unwelcome Surprises," Time, 15 June 1942, 30.
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"inexplicable theory of a private war" as justification for Finland's continued 
participation in the war.26
Even though some segments in the American press had concluded that 
Finland was a Nazi satellite, there was evidence of friction between Germany 
and Finland. Hermann Goering, in a speech to mark the anniversary of 
Hitler's ascension to power, declared that the Winter War of 1939-1940 "was 
perhaps the cleverest campaign in world history." Goering alleged the 
Soviets deliberately conducted the war in a fumbling fashion to fool Germany 
and the world about their strength. The Finns protested this suggestion 
bitterly. Newsweek stated that Finland wanted peace but needed food from 
Germany. The New York Times sided with the Finns, stating that Finnish 
fighting qualities had caused the Soviet setbacks in the Winter War. Then 
the Finns were fighting a defensive war on their native soil, as the Russians 
were doing now against the Nazis. The New York Times also commented that 
the Finns were doing less well in the present war which was aggressive. 
Sympathizing with Finland's plight the New York Times observed that 
"Finland wanted to be left alone but could not be." Almost the only way out 
of the war for Finland that Newsweek saw was United States intervention.26 7
In 1943 the sympathizers and critics of Finland began to polarize. A 
New York Times article by Arthur Krock argued that a realistic decision of 
America's relations should be based on "who is not with us is against us." If 
the basis of the postwar peace, however, was to be the Atlantic Charter rather 
than power politics, Krock argued that that required the promise to Finland of 
its independence and territory. A New York Times editorial contended that so
26 "Finns Long for End of War," New York Times, 27 September 1942, "Fettered Finns," 
Newsweek, 14 December 1942, 74.
27 "Hitler and Goering Warn Europe Faces Red Peril," New Yor k Times 1 January 1943, 1, 
and "Finland vs. Goering," 5 February 1943, 14, "Finland Reaching Crossroads" Newsweek,
15 February 1943, 42.
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far the United States had been patient and sympathetic towards the Finns, but, 
even so, America's responsibility did not end there. The United States had a 
duty to replace German supplies if Finland could withdraw from the war 
because, observed the New York Times, "little nations cannot go it alone."28 
Finland was said to be trying hard to find a way out of her perilous situation. 
Despite her present alignment, the New York Times thought that, "Finland 
deserves our sympathy, for she is one of the small nations victimized by her 
mighty neighbors." Finland could well become a test case, in fact a show case, 
for the Atlantic Charter as applied to small nations. 29 By considering it a test 
case, the American press raised the status of Finland's independence among 
the Allies in general and the American public in particular.
Time argued, however, that just because the United States maintained 
relations with Finland did not mean that the Allies would or could keep the 
Russians out of Finland. Nonetheless, after the defeat of Stalingrad, the only 
hope left for the Finns was that the United States or Great Britain would save 
Finland from the Russians. President Ryti, opening Finland's parliament 
1943, said that the Finnish people could look forward to the future with 
confidence because the "Civilized nations cannot sink so deep that they will 
not acknowledge every people's right to life and liberty."30 Time interpreted 
Ryti's statement as an appeal to the United States and Great Britain for the 
preservation of Finnish independence.
The New Republic asserted that most Americans had been mixed up 
about Finland in recent years, seeing her as a brave little country whose 
people were admired and whose athletes, composers, musicians, and prompt 28930
28 Arthur Krock, "Position of Finland Again to Forefront," New York Times 9 February 1943, 
"Finland's Hard Choice," New York Times, 26 February 1943.
29 "War Weary Finland," New York Times 17 February 1943, 20.
30 "Confidence in Helsinki," Time, 15 February 1943, 31-32.
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payments on a small debt appealed to American national sentiment. Too 
much had been made of Finnish democracy, contended the New Republic, 
their government was a natural Nazi ally. In determining American policy 
"sentimentality and glorifications must be absent in our thoughts," warned 
the New Republic.^ Finland had made a mistake and now had to suffer the 
consequences for trying to crush Russia when she thought she had the 
opportunity.
The New York Times re-emphasized Finland's test case status, stating 
that Finland's will for peace could not be doubted. In an editorial it argued 
that since the United States was not at war with Finland, its surrender need 
not be unconditional. A Finnish peace, furthermore, would be a good 
foundation for future peace.31 2
Jack Gerber argued forcefully in the Nation against a soft line towards 
Finland. Nazi propaganda claimed Finland was fighting to help prevent 
Bolshevism from dominating the world. According to Gerber, Finland was 
not a democracy, but was as thoroughly occupied by Germany as Denmark.
He alleged that Finland did not particularly want American friendship. On 
the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor , Finnish government officials toasted 
Japanese victory at the Japanese embassy in Finland. Nor was Finland merely 
fighting for her independence. Finns were alleged to be fighting on every 
section of the Russian front. Therefore, concluded Gerber, the United States 
should not come to Finland's aid as it would only help Germany.33 That 
Gerber's three assumptions were incorrect did not hinder their adoption by 
more and more critics of Finland in the United States during the war. The 
Nation continued to chastise the Finns who, according to Joachim Joesten, had
31 "Finland's Peace Feelers," New Republic 1 March 1943, 268-69.
32 "Finland as a Test Case," New York Times, 3 March 1943, 22.
33 Jack Gerber, "Finland's 'Peace' Offensive," Nation, 13 March 1943, 379.
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only themselves to blame for their predicament. "Whatever the Finns 
cultural achievements and their lonely heroism in 1939," argued Joesten, it 
was absurd to think of Finland as a democracy fighting a defensive war. 
Democracy, he contended, could not survive in any nation that admitted 
Hitler's legions.34
As prospects of a separate peace increased, the New York Times 
continued to argue that Finland's peace would be a test of the pledges and 
policies of the United Nations. The New York Times stated that Great Britain 
and the United States had to shoulder some responsibility for Finland's fate 
since they pressured Finland to make peace. Finland had, an editorial 
observed, "always been in category by herself in World War II," and she never 
did formally join the Axis. The defeat of Germany and postwar international 
organization would eliminate any threat to Leningrad and, hence, any Soviet 
need for Finnish territory. The New York Times believed that Finland was 
entitled to a just peace and full protection of the United Nations' 
declarations.35 36 An editorial in March argued that Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull's advice to the Finns to get out of the war implicitly assumed some 
responsibility for Finland's ultimate fate, yet, complained the New York Times, 
"we have failed to offer the Finns any assurances."36 A month later in 
discussing the popularity of the Finns in the past, the New York Times 
commented that their democratic "middle way," like Sweden's, was in some 
respects ahead of the United States and Great Britain. "They were good 
people before the war, we do not suppose they are bad now."37
34 Joachim Joesten, “Finland Waits to Long," Nation, 4 December 1943, 658-660.
35 "Finland Seeks Peace," New York Times 16 February 1944, 16.
36 "Finland: A Test of the Peace," New York Times, 16 March 1944, 18.
37 "Finland's Dilemma," New York Times 25 April 1944, 22.
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All the speculation in the press about a separate peace for Finland 
caused Germany to demand reassurances. In June of 1944 the Finnish 
government knew that if they did not publically declare they would not make 
a separate peace, then Germany would cut off all aid. The Finnish 
government became almost paralyzed when faced with binding their nation 
to a Germany doomed to defeat or surrendering unconditionally to Russia. 
President Ryti sent a personal promise to Hitler that Finland would not seek a 
separate peace.38 After Ryti's letter to Hitler, John Scott, Time's correspondent 
in Finland, did not anticipate a happy ending for the Finns in July of 1944.
His analysis was that Finns would "probably continue to fight for several 
weeks, until the Russians have achieved a costly military victory which will 
likely lead to civil war and ultimate devastation." Scott fatalistically observed 
that Finland's course seemed set.39 His grim prediction proved to be too 
pessimistic. The Finns, who had already had a vicious civil war, resolved to 
rebuild their country after they had obtained a separate peace.40
After Finland and the Soviet Union had agreed to an armistice in 
September, 1944, a Minneapolis Morning Tribune editorial discounted the 
Finnish withdrawal from the war as having been long taken for granted. The 
editorial judged Soviet demands to be dictated by the present war with 
Germany. Finland had made a mistake by not surrendering earlier. The 
Minneapolis Tribune also thought that the treatment of Finland would be a test 
of postwar Soviet intentions.38 9401 A New York Times editorial judged the 
armistice to be an old fashioned military settlement and concurred that 
Finland had waited too long to get out of the war. The New York Times took
38 Charles Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, 210-222.
39 "Finland, Bewitched and Betrayed," Time 10 July 1944, 34.
40 For a description of the Finnish Civil War see John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1965) 216-224.
41 "Finland Drops Out," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 5 September 1944.
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by the 1944 Armistice
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satisfaction in the outcome, however, because the "annexation of Finland 
would have been a tragedy for the principles of peace and justice."42
The terms of the peace settlement for Finland were harsh. The Finns 
were to withdraw to the 1940 borders and disarm all German soldiers on 
Finnish soil. The Finns were to lease the Porkkala peninsula, only twenty- 
five miles from Helsinki, to the Russians for 50 years. The Finnish territory 
ceded to the Soviet Union represented 12 percent of Finland's prewar area, 
and an even greater portion of some of Finland's economic resources, 
including 25 percent of its hydroelectric power potential. Finland's war dead 
between 1939 and 1945 has been estimated to be 85,000, or 2 percent of 
Finland's total population.43
Summation
The American press did not give Finland as much coverage during the 
Continuation War as it had during the Winter War and the coverage was less 
favorable. Finland was recognized as being in a difficult situation, but the left 
wing publications considered Finland to responsible for her own troubles. 
Gone from the press reports were images of "Valiant Finland," except for 
when articles were attempting to debunk the heroic image of Finland that 
remained in American public opinion from the Winter War. The press, 
particularly the New York Times, expressed sympathy for the plight of the 
Finnish people. The fate of Finland, furthermore, was held as a precursor for 
the postwar era. 423
42 "Footnotes to Finlandia," New York Times, 21 September 1944.
43 See Fred Singelton, A Short History of Finland, 138-139; and John Wuorinen, A History of 
Finland, 382. Even the cease fire was disadvantageous to the Finns who ceased military 
hostilities on September 4, 1944 while the Soviets did not cease military operations until 
September 5, 1944. Thus the Soviets prolonged "an unchivalrous one-sided shooting for 
another twenty-four hours." See Antole Mazour, Finland Between East and West, (New York: 
Nostrand, 1956), 168.
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Great Britain placed more emphasis on Finland's complicity with 
Germany during the war and that the Finns could have simply chosen not to 
enter the war. The British press gave the impression that Finland decided to 
exit the war only after it was clear that Germany would not win. The 
American press, with the exception of the hard left which argued that the 
Nazis were running Finland, was more willing to accept the Finnish position 
that the Finns got out of the war as soon as they thought they were able.
Both the Anglo and American press portrayed the Finnish people as war 
weary and wanting peace while suffering severe wartime conditions. Finland 
was anticipated to be a test case of the postwar peace. The image of Finland 
had been tarnished and perhaps became a bit more realistic at the end of the 
Continuation War, although during the war the Anglo-American press often 
did not present an accurate portrayal of conditions in Finland. Looking back 
on World War II, the press could agree that Finland "could point to great 
bravery on the part of its people, but little wisdom on the part of its leaders."44
The image of "Valiant Finland" from the Winter War was not 
forgotten. With the wide ranging battles in the Pacific, Europe, and Africa, 
the public had to be reminded of Finland's position vis-a-vis Germany and 
the Soviet Union. Despite the tangling complexities of Finland's diplomatic 
situation, Finland was but a sideshow for the Allies in World War II. Press 
coverage tended to try and prove that Finland's behavior in the Continuation 
War was not so much valiant as it was a tragic misfortune or, perhaps, 
opportunistic and revengeful. Once Finland had obtained peace, the press 
went back to the "Honest Finland" image as it anticipated that hard working, 
thrifty Finns would be able to rebuild their country. Although Finland had 
been criticized for their participation in the war, once they were out and it was
44 Charles Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, 256.
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apparent that Finland had not contributed to an Axis victory, the Anglo- 
American press appeared willing to "forgive," and forget, with more interest 
in the latter.
Finland had gone from the hero of the "Free" world in the Winter 
War to a forgotten and forsaken nation as World War II drew to a close. 
Facing a very uncertain future, the Finns had learned painfully that they 
could not expect any help to come from the United States and Great Britain. 
So the Finns set out to establish peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and 
to rebuild their country. After surviving two wars with the Soviet Union in 
five years, they still had a very difficult time facing them.
Berry argues that the "Honest Finland" and "Valiant Finland" images 
were the foundation for Finnish-American relations during and after World 
War II. In the Continuation War, however, the "Valiant" image disappeared 
almost entirely to be replaced by an image of Finland as an "unfortunate" or 
possibly "obstinate" country. The Anglo and American press differentiated 
between the Finnish people and the Finnish government to account for the 
change in their stance towards Finland from the Winter War. Berry focused 
primarily on the image of Finland's foreign policy as it related to the policy 
objectives of the isolationists and internationalist press in America. In this 
regard his analysis is insightful and helpful. Nevertheless, he neglects the 
American press' impression of the Finnish people apart from their utility in 
supporting a particular agenda.
While the press coverage of Finland undoubtedly was affected by 
foreign policy preferences, press images and perceptions of Finland revealed 
genuine biases and assumptions that were formed separately from the 
concerns of foreign policy. In fact, these assumptions may have actually 
influenced opinions on foreign policy. This is, in effect, what made Finland a
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special case during the Continuation War. A nation that could be considered 
an enemy was treated with considerable sympathy. It is impossible to 
determine to what degree the press created public opinion rather than merely 
reflected it, but it is clear that good will toward's Finland did carry over from 
the Winter War through the Continuation War. Berry asserts that the 
postwar relationship between the United States and Finland was based on the 
"Honest" and "Valiant" Finland paradigms rather than the dictates of Cold 
War politics. In 1944, anyone trying to predict Finland's future would be 
looking through a glass darkly.
IV. THE YEARS OF DANGER 1945-1948
To get out of a difficulty, 
one must usually go through it.
Samuel Eastoni
Describing 1945 to 1948 as "years of danger" does not imply that the 
previous five years had been safe and carefree. Rather, it is to point out how 
phenomenal Finland's survival was and how precarious its independence 
remained. After surviving two wars with the Soviet Union the Finns still 
had to drive the Germans out of Lapland, resettle refugees from Karelia once 
again, and face the threat of a communist takeover from within as well as 
from without.2 After September, 1944, Finland was bound by the terms of its 
armistice agreement with the Soviet Union. By the spring of 1944 two-thirds 
of the Finns who had left Karelia after the Winter War had returned to their 
homes, only to see this territory handed back to the Soviet Union under the 
armistice agreement, making them refugees again for the second time in four 
years. Finland had to provide for 420,000 Finns who evacuated from areas 
ceded to the Soviet Union.
Besides having to rebuild itself, Finland was required to make 
reparation payments. Finland was to provide the Soviet Union with $300 
million worth of specific materials at 1938 American gold dollar price levels. 
The actual cost to Finland of providing these goods has been estimated to be 
closer to $1 billion. If Finland failed to meet its monthly quota, the Soviets 1
1 Samuel Easton, as cited in Bless Your Heart, Series 2, (Edina, MN: Heartland Samples, 
1990), calander quotation for January 28th.
2 Austin Goodrich, Study in Sisu, 90, notes that one of the few Finnish books written about 
the time between 1944 and 1948 was Vauran Vuodet, "Years of Danger."
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imposed a 5 percent monthly fine. Over 70 percent of the goods that the 
Soviets requested were machinery, ships, and cable and wire products. These 
segments of Finnish industry before the war had been small or nonexistent. 
The Finns were able to meet the first year of their reparation payments largely 
by the forfeiting existing assets to the Soviet Union, including 104 ships from 
the Finnish merchant marine. To meet the reparations required the 
expansion and creation of new industries. The Soviets modified the terms of 
the treaty and in 1948 reduced the outstanding debt in half. Many Finns 
viewed the official reduction by the Soviets as an effort to influence the 1948 
Finnish elections. The values the Soviets awarded to certain Finnish goods 
were frequently widely distorted from their actual production costs.3 The 
Finns had fought the Soviets for five years to avoid national subjugation, but 
they were now to find their whole nation, in effect, toiling in a Russian gulag 
for eight years. The press paid more attention to the reparations problem 
after 1948, when the most difficult years for Finland already had past.
During these early postwar years Finland, under the guidance Juho 
Paasikivi, attempted gradually establish its neutrality. In 1946, Paasikivi, who 
had been Prime Minister since the end of the War, succeeded the ailing 
Mannerheim as President and served in that capacity through 1955. Paasikivi 
pursed a policy of peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union. War ravaged 
Western Europe was rebuilt after World War II with the assistance of the 
Marshall Plan. Finland, however, did not accept any Marshall plan aid, 
though the United States offered it, because it did not want to anger the
3 John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 388-392. The "Golden Schooners" illustrate the price 
distortion the Finns suffered. These 90 wooden, 300 ton ocean going ships had their price 
fixed at $15,000 each,but the cost of producing each one amounted to $180,000.
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Soviet Union.4 It was not until 1947 that the official peace treaty for Finland 
with the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth was signed in Paris, 
formalizing the end of hostilities. Finland really came to the attention of the 
Anglo-American press in 1948 when, after the coup in Czechoslovakia, Stalin 
requested that the Finns come and negotiate a mutual assistance pact.
Throughout these years of danger Finland's image was on a roller 
coaster ride. With the end of World War II, the basis for perceiving Finland 
in Great Britain and the United States changed as their relationship with the 
Soviet Union changed. The press in both nations oscillated between 
considering Finland a western democracy or a Soviet satellite. Opinions 
correspondingly varied between considering Finland to have been a tragic 
victim or to be guilty for its predicament. The Finns were praised in both 
nations, however, for their workman like discipline and industriousness in 
tackling their own domestic problems. The coverage of Finland was sporadic 
except for 1948 when Finland was for a brief time in the spotlight of East-West 
relations.
Finland' American Press Image, 1945 to 1948
In February 1945 Newsweek found spic and span Helsinki to be in sharp
contrast to war devastated Leningrad. Helsinki was already a peacetime city
with no blackout or curfew. The Finns orientation towards the United States,
Newsweek commented, was maintained during the war as Helsinki theaters
showed Hollywood movies. The Finnish people did not believe that that
they had been defeated. Newsweek observed, "a certain air of complete
impenitence," was apparent among the Finnish people. Finland's outlook 4
4 Max Jakobson commented, "the Marshall Plan was designed to save Europe from 
Communism; Finland may have saved herself from Communism by saying no to the Marshall 
Plan." See Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 60. Finland did, however, profit indirectly 
from the Marshall Plan, as the countries that received Marshall Plan aid had hard 
currency to pay for Finnish exports.
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was relatively optimistic: most of her remaining industry was intact and in 
good shape; an immense market in Great Britain was waiting; and Sweden 
and the Soviet Union had assisted with Finland's food shortage. The 
Russians had demonstrated their desire to live in harmony by sending 
foodstuffs to Finland that were not plentiful in the Soviet Union. The 
fundamental problem facing the Finns, Newsweek said, was psychological, the 
Finns were stubborn. If they could change their attitude towards Russia then 
they could anticipate a peaceful future.5 6
As winter approached in 1945, George Axelson reported on the 
Scandinavian outlook in the New York Times. He thought that Norway and 
Sweden would eat well but would probably freeze, and for the Finns, the 
prospects were pretty much the same except that, "they are more likely to 
starve as well." Furthermore, Axelson commented, Finland's situation was 
made worse because it had fought on the losing side and therefore had to pay 
reparations to the Soviet Union. Finland was experiencing phenomenal 
inflation as the currency had been devalued 60 percent in four months to 
continue the flow of exports. Labor rates were expected to increase 165 percent 
in that year. Finland had a housing shortage despite having plenty of wood, 
due to shortages of concrete, nails, iron, and other building materials. A 
capital levy had been raised, even shoes and hats were taxed. Finnish 
workers did not want to work overtime because all that did was make extra 
money for the tax collector. The Finns seemed to be in for a strenuous 
ordeal.6
In December, 1946, the New York Times thought that Finland's request 
for a $150 million loan from the United States probably would not be granted 
on the grounds that it would go directly to the Soviet Union. Though there
5 "Tough, impenitent Finland Ticklish Diplomatic Problem," Newsweek, 5 February 1945, 25.
6 George Axelson,"Scandinavian Outlook," New York Times, 13 November 1945, 24.
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was sentiment for helping the Finns, the United States did not want to be, in 
effect, paying for reparations to the Soviet Union. The United States' attitude, 
the New York Times insisted, did parallel that of the British: that Finland must 
get along with the Soviet Union on her own.7 A year later Finland was still, 
"as hard up as ever." The Finns were blaming strikes, particularly in the 
United States, reported the New York Times, for causing lags in their 
reparations. The Finnish Government employed ingenious methods to raise 
money. Civilians could purchase fancy titles that ranged from $2000 to 
become a "Statsrad," a state counselor, down to $8 to be an official choir 
singer.8 9
In April, 1946, Sidney Sulkin wrote in the New Republic of a Finnish 
paradox. Western Europe was more occupied by Allied forces than was 
Finland. The Finn in the street, Sulkin asserted, was expecting the United 
States and Great Britain to attack the Soviet Union. Sulkin thought a change 
had come over Finland. Sisu used to mean whoever had it could bear all 
difficulties; in 1946 he stated that sisu meant self pity which he alleged to 
probably be the most common emotion in the country. He thought that the 
Finns should be pleased with how well they had it. His article was one of the 
most critical of Finland in the American press during this period.9
For the first time since prior to the Winter War, Finland became the 
subject of a Foreign Affairs feature article by Eric Dancy who was a British 
reporter. The Finns, he observed, never had much political instinct and that 
compounded their unfortunate position. Language difficulties, he asserted, 
had much to do with the Finns' political ignorance. Partly due to language, 
he insisted, the Swedish speaking Finns were better informed. In the postwar
7 "U.S. likely to bar Finns Bid for Loan/' New York Times, 1 December 1945, 3.
8 "Finland's Regime Walks Tightrope," New York Times, 22 December 1946, 22.
9 Sidney Sulkin, "The Finnish Paradox," New Republic, 1 April 1946, 433-34.
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trials of wartime governments, Finnish democracy was on trail. Dancy 
commented that people ignorant in political matters cannot govern 
themselves. The Finns were now focused inward because of their economic 
troubles. Their exactness in meeting their payments had caused the Soviets 
to extend debt payment for two additional years. The Finns had the 
opportunity to develop important future markets. Finland had to pay the 
price, however, Dancy said, of ending its experiment with a Scandinavian 
orientation. Finland could not be considered a neutral country.io
Time noticed much improvement in Helsinki in the two years since 
the war. The Finnish calorie level was higher than most of Europe's and 
Finland was observed to have a degree of freedom unknown in other nations 
defeated by the Soviet Union. The Finns present situation was by no means 
easy as Finland had to create a metal and engineering industry from scratch, 
and their economy was being more and more integrated with the Soviet 
Union. Time speculated as to the causes of Russia's surprisingly lenient 
treatment: Russia wanted to collect its reparations with little interference; 
perhaps Russia wanted to avoid a long struggle with Finland; the Russians 
gained a substantial propaganda advantage for their relations with 
Scandinavia.it
The Finns were described as being frank and honest talkers. Said one
Finn to Sam Welles, a Time reporter, about Finland's relations with Russia:
"Its too bad, Russians are often fine people individually. We have many
things in common; we both like to drink. But get them in a mass and they go
crazy." Welles did not consider Finland to be a satellite because the Finns had
their freedom. "To people whose fiber is almost as hard as the granite ledges
that crop out all over their country," he declared, "that means a lot." The *1
1° Eric Dancy, Foreign Affairs Quarterly, April 1946, 513-525.
11 "On Tiptoe," Time 5 August 1946, 34.
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Finns needed a tough fiber to house the 450,000 emigres from the lost 
territory in Karelia. The highest estimate of the number of Finns that choose 
to remain in their homes and live under Soviet rule, he reported, was only 
40. If the Finns maintained their "sturdy gait" he predicted that they would 
be relatively better off than the average Russian in a few years.!2
A New York Times editorial stated that the Finns had lost a considerable 
part of their territory for their errors. If Finland was left alone, it had a 
promising future. Unfortunately, the editorial observed, Finland was not 
being left alone. Although within the grip Russian power, the Finns were 
not willingly playing the part of Russian stooge. 13
An editorial in the Finnish Trade Review by Sakrai Tuomioja, President 
of the Bank of Finland, received much notice in the United States. He 
thanked the United States for giving loans that would allow Finland to pay 
back everyone on time. Commenting on Finland's present condition he said, 
"We are poor today but do not feel our place is in the poorhouse." After 
reporting this the New York Times added that Finland's re-entry into world 
markets was an accomplished fact.12 *4 It criticized those who termed Finland's 
armistice conditions as a "soft peace."15 *Time observed that despite having to 
pay the highest per capita reparations to the Soviet Union, conditions in 
Finland had improved. The Soviets had not sprung any surprises on top of 
the treaty terms. "Under this treatment," Time commented, "which calls 
mainly for hard work, the industrious Finns have thrived."15
12 Sam Welles, "Nobody's Satellite," Time, 16 June 1947, 34.
!3 "Finland and the Russians," New York Times, 20 May 1947, 24.
14 "Finns to send U.S. More Newsprint," New York Times, 24 May 1947, 9. The United States 
ultimately loaned Finland approximately $120 million through the Export-Import bank. See 
John Wuorinen, 468.
15 "In the Porkkala Enclave," New York Times, 29 August 1947, 16.
15 "Finland's Autumn Cloud," Time 1 September 1947, 22.
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The American press regarded the Finnish people's spirit to be 
unbroken. The Finns were thought to have been in a troubling economic 
and political situation and seemed to be making progress. The press was 
returning to the "Honest" Finland characterization implying a diligent work 
ethic. The British press was on the whole more critical of Finland's wartime 
policy and less sympathetic to its postwar plight.
Finland's Anglo Press Image, 1945 to 1948
The Times saw Finland's elections in March, 1945, as an opportunity for 
Finland to redeem itself. A new parliament might be able to "lead the 
country out of the morass of defeat and humiliation in which subservience to 
Germany has plunged it." The Times reflected a very negative view of 
Finland's involvement in the war. It noted, however, that Finland was the 
first belligerent to have the opportunity of a fresh start and that no other 
country in Europe had yet been able to have an orderly democratic election. 
The Times suggested patience may be needed for Finland to rejoin the 
Western democracies because it would take time for people to recover hold of 
reality after being exposed to undiluted German propaganda. Certainly 
neither the United States nor Great Britain wished "to take an excessively 
harsh view of Finland's recent policy, which both have been predisposed to 
believe was forced upon a reluctant people by an unrepresentative 
government." The Finnish people had been "grievously misled."17 Placing 
blame for Finland's situation primarily on the Finnish government, the 
Times was able to avoid criticizing the Finnish people.
In December, 1945, Eric Dancy wrote in the New Statesmen that the 
existence of reparations held Finland together economically as both the left 
and right, for their own reasons, wished to complete the payments on 17
17 "Finland at the Polls," Times(London), 17 March 1945, 3.
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schedule. The country was very much divided, however, over the issue of 
war guilt. The attitude towards Russia among the Finns, Dancy stated, was 
largely a matter of age. The older generation, consisting of those such as 
Mannerheim and Paasikivi, still spoke Russian. The younger generation, he 
assessed, was curious and open to good relations with the Russians. The 
middle generation, however, whose opinions were formed during and after 
the Revolution, was skeptical. He thought that it was a commonly held 
assumption among the Finns that the Russians would continue to import 
from Finland what they were presently receiving for free. Trade was bound 
to influence future Finnish feeling towards Russia.18
Under the terms of the Armistice agreement, the Communist party, 
which had been officially banned in 1930, was once more legalized. In March, 
1945, the Communists won 23.5 percent of the popular vote giving them 49 
out of 200 seats in parliament.18 9 The Economist thought with the March, 1945, 
election of "new men" to the Parliament, the Finnish voters had disavowed 
the old war policies as only 90 out of the 200 representatives had been 
reelected. The only doubt about Finland, asserted the Economist, was not its 
economic conditions (Finland did not default on her loans), but its uncertain 
political future.20
Recognizing the importance of economics to foreign policy, the 
Economist warned in 1946 that "political alignments shift with economic 
exigencies." The Nordic countries could not get coal from Britain so they 
looked to the Soviet Union. Unless the West recovered, the Economist feared 
that a Nordic bloc could possibly have an Eastern orientation.21
18 Eric Dancy, "The Finnish Outlook," New Statesmen and Nation, 22 December 1945, 420.
19 See John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 425.
20 "Finland's New Start," Economist, 31 March 1945, 406-407.
21 "A Scandinavian Bloc," Economist, 16 November 1946, 792..
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In 1947, the New Statesmen thought that if it was not special there 
certainly was something unique about Finland, "the happy freak of Europe."
It was the only country that had fought against the Allied powers that was 
never occupied by foreign troops, it suffered little direct damage from the war, 
and appeared to have the healthiest economy of any of the belligerents in 
Europe. Everybody, from Brazil and Great Britain to the United States and 
the Soviet Union had been helpful to Finland in one way or another. The 
Finnish working class, whether for material or moral incentives, was 
working with a "remarkable sense of responsibility and solidarity." The 
British periodical noted that significant attention in Finland was given to 
American perceptions. Too much nationalization too fast, some Finns 
feared, might cause the United States to stop the flow of credit.2 2  The 
pressures of reparations deliveries had required state involvement in some 
industries, particularly ship building.23
In October, 1947 the Economist discussed what it considered to be the 
four strains of Socialism in Europe: Scandinavian, German, East and West 
European. Temperament and experience of power, asserted the Economist, 
made the "Scandinavian Socialists reformists, interested in improving 
working conditions and economic efficiency rather than petrified Marxist 
dogma." Scandinavian socialists desired to maintain Finnish independence 
but clumsy American foreign policy, it lamented, made Scandinavia look like 
it was leaning to the left. Five months later, in February, 1948, the Economist 
observed that little weight was often given to the desire of Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Iceland not to complicate Finland's delicate geopolitical 23
22 "Finland: The Next Phase," New Statesmen and Nation, 22 March 1947.
23 John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 415.
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position. This was especially true when they discussed the topic of closer 
economic and political cooperation with other European countries.24
The coverage of Finland between 1945 and early 1948 in the Anglo and 
American press was favorable and sympathetic. Overall, a change occurred in 
the tone of the coverage after World War II ended and the postwar objectives 
of the Soviet Union began to visibly diverge from its wartime Allies, the 
United States and Great Britain. The Anglo press paid more attention to 
specific Anglo-Finnish trade issues and the domestic political scene in 
Finland, and saw reasons to criticize American policy towards Finland and 
the other Nordic nations. An intriguing dichotomy is present in that during 
this early postwar period, Finland is sometimes portrayed as a surprisingly 
lucky country on one hand because it had retained its independence and on 
the other hand a tragically unfortunate country because of its reparations 
burden. Finland could in fact be considered both. With the possible 
exception of being described as "obstinate" and "stubborn" the 
characterizations of the Finnish people in the Anglo and American press 
were positive and sympathetic.
The 1948 Treaty Crisis
Relations between the Superpowers were to deteriorate further in 1948. 
The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 25, 1948, 
sent shock waves throughout the West. President Harry Truman was 
convinced that he was facing the same situation with the Soviets that France 
and Great Britain had faced ten years earlier with Hitler.25 On February 23, 
President Paasikivi received a personal letter from Stalin requesting Finland 245
24 "Neighbors of Russia" Economist, 25 October 1947, 679-680, and "Northern Light on Mr. 
Beven," 14 February 1948, 269-271.
25 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia,and the Cold War 1945-1990, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1991), 71.
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to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance similar to those the Soviet Union 
had previously concluded with Hungary and Rumania. Finland was the only 
European nation bordering the Soviet Union that had not completed a 
defense agreement with it against German aggression. The letter was made 
public five days later, on February 28. The West regarded it as part of a Soviet 
attack against democracy in Eastern Europe. Many in the press thought that 
Finnish independence would be short lived.
On April 6, 1948, the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow. The 
whole world seemed to be surprised at the lenient terms of the treaty. The 
treaty called for Finland to resist any attack against itself or any attack against 
the Soviet Union through Finnish territory. If necessary the Soviet Union 
would assist Finland. The treaty was to defend against an attack by Germany 
or any nation allied with it.26
A New York Times editorial saw Stalin imitating Hitler's tactics, trying to 
grab Finland after Czechoslovakia. The editorial was pessimistic, stating that 
Stalin's blunt demand could only mean the end of Finnish independence and 
the beginning of Sovietization. It lamented that in 1939 the "sturdy" Finns 
still dared to defy Russian demands but now they seemed resigned to their 
fate. Finland was shackled, the editorial insisted, by a treaty concluded with 
American and British consent. Finland was unable to resist and the United 
Nations was silent. "While the world watches and waits," the New York Times 
complained, "one more small country is preparing to go to its doom."27
John Walker, Time correspondent in Helsinki, reported in March that 
despite the beautiful spring the atmosphere was "hauntingly reminiscent of 
Europe in 1939." He sensed that Europe could once again be drifting into 267
26 For the text of the treaty see Fred Singleton, A Short History of Finland, 189-191.
27 "One by One," New York Times, 1 March 1948, p22.
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disaster. The Finnish people, who he thought were "Europe's hardest 
working," had been "knocking themselves out" to meet the Soviet 
reparations, thereby denying them an excuse to intervene. He described the 
political response in Finland to be confusion bordering on panic. "As usual 
the Social Democrats held the key to the situation, and as usual did not know 
what to do." About the only satisfaction Walker saw for the Finns was that 
the Swedes were even in a worse flap over the Soviet's treaty request than the 
Finns.28
After the Russo-Finnish treaty had been signed, the New York Times 
took a pessimistic view. The treaty placed Finland firmly in the Eastern 
Europe bloc even though some "verbal concessions to Finnish sensibilities" 
raised the illusion of Finnish neutrality. The New York Times did not put any 
confidence in Soviet assurances and considered Finnish neutrality to be a 
sham. The Soviets had given the same assurance of troops entering only by 
mutual agreement to Lithuania in 1939. The decisive fact, the New York Times 
asserted, was that Finland was at Russia's mercy. It hoped that Finland would 
be spared and continue the democratic tradition they had long exemplified, 
but unless the West gave Finland more support, it had only a slim chance.29
Newsweek's Joseph Philips expected Finland to suffer the same fate as 
the Czechs. For a short time Finland "appeared to be the luckiest of all 
defeated countries under Russian occupation." Contrary to Philips assertion, 
Finland was not exactly under "occupation." The causes for Soviet 
displeasure with Finland were similar to Czechoslovakia. The Finnish 
Communist party was likely to lose seats in the next election. Finland traded 
heavily with the West. A Moscow trained cadre lead by Yrjo and Hertta Leino 
were ready to take power. Now was the time for Stalin to act, but his long 289
28 "Too Small," Time 15 March 1948, 33.
29 "The Russo-Finnish Pact," New York Times, 18 April 1948, 24.
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range goal, Philips thought, was difficult to discern. Was it to gain control of 
Scandinavia, which was only accessible via Finland? Or, perhaps, the 
tightening of Soviet defenses against the pull of the Marshall plan? Both 
Finland and Czechoslovakia had economic and sentimental attachments to 
the West.30 After the treaty agreement was reached Newsweek said that the 
stage had been "set for ostentatious Russian intervention or equally 
ostentatious non-intervention." Paasikivi had taken the Russians at their 
word that they wanted peace and dismissed Finland's number one 
Communist from the Eduskunta, Finland's parliaments Though in 
retrospect the Finnish newspapers appear to have been correct, the American 
press regarded their observations to be "window dressing" or ignored them 
altogether.
Hjalmar Bjornson was the Minneapolis Tribune 's editorial reviewer of 
the foreign language press. He commented that most Finnish newspapers 
saw little connection between the recent events in Czechoslovakia and 
Stalin's note to Finland. He noted that Swedish papers, however, were 
concerned over a Finnish-Soviet defense pact and that a liberal Swedish paper 
predicted that Finland would be made into another satellite.32
The Minneapolis Tribune thought that the Finnish-Soviet treaty 
represented a shift in Soviet tactics. Finland had come off less badly than 
feared, with Finnish sovereignty preserved. Unlike the "other satellite 
nations" the Finns' treaty with the Soviets was for ten, not twenty years. The 
Minneapolis Tribune's editorial analysis was that the mild agreement was due 
to Russia's need for an attractive model for Norway and Sweden, as well as
30 Joseph B. Philips, "Background of the Soviet-Finnish Case," Newsweek, 8 March 1948, 36.
31 "Finland, Setting the Stage," Newsweek, 31 May 1948, 32.
32 Hjalmar Bjornson, "Press of Other Nations," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 6 March 1948,
6.
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Finnish determination and Western resistance following the Communist 
seizure of power in Czechoslovakia.33
The American press anticipated that the moment for Stalin to act had 
come after his letter to Finland and the Czech coup. Although the American 
press regretted that Finland would lose her independence, there was no call to 
go to the defense of Finland. The American press was pleasantly surprised 
with the lenient terms of the treaty but was not certain why the terms were as 
they were.
The Economist predicted that Finland was likely to experience the fate of 
Czechoslovakia. Russia could over-run Finland in one day. So far Finland's 
behavior had been "cautious but correct." In April the Economist was 
surprised and relieved by the terms of the Finnish-Soviet treaty. Europe was 
in a tinderbox state and the Soviets did not want to touch off another war.
The Russians, asserted the Economist, remembered 1939 and the Finns had a 
real bargaining power - inner cohesion and moral strength. Furthermore, 
both the Finns and the Soviets desired to preserve Finnish neutrality.34
In July, 1948 the Economist observed that the coercion of Finland would 
end Swedish neutrality. The July elections passed by uneventfully by the 
grace of Russia. The Communists had lost 11 seats in the Eduskunta, their 
total being reduced to 38 seats. The Finns had managed to keep their delicate 
balance between East and West by a mixture of co-operation and firmness 
with Russia and the Economist concluded that Finland had no reason to 
change its policy.35 Russia's good behavior towards Finland, commented the
33 "Shift in Soviet Tactics," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 8 April 1948, 6.
34 "Next Stage in Finland," Economist 6 March 1948, 380-81, and "The Finns Pull it off," 10 
April 1948, 577-78.
35 "Communist Defeat in Finland," Economist, 10 July 1948, 48 and "The Centre Wins in 
Finland," 49.
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Economist, in November, 1948 provided evidence for Sweden to justify its 
neutral position.36
On March 1, 1948 the Times compared the events in Finland with what 
had happened in Czechoslovakia. The Times ominously reported, "the 
Russian sickle flicks warningly at Finland." In country after country, the 
Times reported, the "proper moment" Lenin spoke of was being sought. The 
present Soviet policy, it summarized, was to keep their hold on the 
borderlands and to oppose the Marshall plan, because the Soviets feared a 
prosperous Europe.37 The Times wrote off Finnish independence rather 
quickly, stating two days later that the actual wording of the treaty would 
signify little because Russia's purpose was to bring Finland fully within 
Russia's camp. Finland had, like Czechoslovakia, tried to live on good terms 
with the Soviet Union since the war. The Times cited Finland's behavior in 
accepting treaty stipulations and fulfilling reparations. The Finns had 
"sought consistently to be strictly neutral and to build up their country by the 
quiet staunch democratic methods which have given Finland a specially high 
place among the free peoples." The Times thought that every precedent 
indicated that the proposed pact would lead to more trouble for the Finns.38
A pact similar to that between the Soviet Union and Hungary or 
Rumania would do more than end Finland's neutrality in the Baltic, asserted 
the Times, it would obligate the Finns to support Soviet aggression. Finland 
would be placed then on the same footing as the 'People's democracies' of 
Eastern Europe. Finland did not, however, want to sever its intimate links 
with the West and Scandinavia. A comparison with Czechoslovakia, 
cautioned the Times, was misleading, not only because it ignored the "sturdy
36 "Will Sweden Stay Neutral," Economist, 27 November 1948, 875.
37 "Soviet Proposal to Finland," Times(London), 1 March 1948, p4, and "March Winds," p5.
38 "Finland Under Pressure," Tfwies(London), 3 March 1948, p5.
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tradition of Finnish independence, but also that undue Soviet pressure 
would be bad for western public opinion.39
After the treaty had been signed, the Times reported Finland's President 
Paasikivi contended that the actual treaty did not change Finland's neutrality 
stance because through the lease of Porkkala, "Finland's neutrality had 
already lost its orthodox character. "40 The Times thought that the reaction 
around the world to the Finnish Soviet pact was relief at the light terms for 
Finland.41 In July, 1948, however, the Times thought that it was still an open 
question whether or not Finland would follow Czechoslovakia.42
The outcome of the Finnish-Soviet treaty left many questions for the 
New Statesmen. Why did the Russians want a treaty at all? Could the Finns 
have refused? Why were the terms so lenient? And how long will the peace 
last? The Soviet's original intentions were by no means clear to the New 
Statesmen. "The leniency of the treaty can only be explained by the effect 
which the Czech crisis had on the world at large and Scandinavia in 
particular." The Soviets certainly had an eye on Sweden and Norway.
Unlike Czechoslovakia, Finland did not expect help from the West; but they 
knew Russia's actions would affect world opinion abroad. The general 
opinion in Finland was that the peace would last.43
The industriousness of the Finnish people, stated the Manchester 
Guardian, gave the country an atmosphere of relative prosperity. They had set 
out tenaciously to overcome the obstacles they faced, including the inflation 
that had taken the cost of living index from 100 in 1938 to 750 in 1948. The 
Manchester Guardian asserted that the Soviet Union changed its policy
39 "Finland and Russia," Times(London), 24 March 1948, p5.
40 "Finnish President on the Pact," Times(London) 10 April 1948, plO.
41 "Fettered Finns," Times(London) 17 May 1948, p5 .
42 "Finland Votes," rimes(London), 1 July 1948 p5.
43 "Finland and Russia," New Statesmen and Nation, 29 May 1948, 427-28.
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towards Finland because of the effect of the Czech crisis on world, especially 
Scandinavian opinion, not because of Finland's tough stance. The Guardian 
said that however proud, the Russians knew that the Finns would not 
provoke them. So Moscow sacrificed the Finnish Communists to make a 
positive impression abroad and they succeed. The danger remained, though, 
of the Soviets gaining economic control.44 The Guardian thought that the 
Finnish elections in July were significant because Finland was the only 
country in the Soviet sphere of influence that had free and fair election. The 
Finnish vote (only 20 percent for the Communists) was a courageous gesture, 
displaying the anti-Soviet attitude of the people, but do not forget, added the 
Guardian, that the vote was cast only by the courtesy of their Russian
neighbor.45
Summation
A divergence of national interests between the United States and Great 
Britain is apparent in their press coverage of Finland. The British were 
interested in economics, restoring trade with Finland to obtain timber 
products for postwar reconstruction. The United States was attempting to 
establish its postwar policy and was evaluating geopolitical realities. The 
press did not perceive a special relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Finland. They were uncertain about Soviet intentions and motivations.
They readily explained the lenient terms of the treaty because of propaganda 
efforts for the Soviet Union in Western Europe in general and Scandinavia 
in particular. The calmness in responding to the Soviet request was 
recognized but considered irrelevant, though the press referred to the
44 "Finland and Russia: Background of the Political Crisis," Manchester Guardian Weekly,
3 June 1948,13.
45 "Finland's Vote," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 July 1948, 9.
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tightrope walked by the Finnish government. The Anglo and American 
consensus was that the Soviet Union did what it wanted to Finland regardless 
of what Finland wanted.
Nevertheless, Finland's position in 1948 was quite surprising. The 
economy had been reorganized to pay war reparations, the country was being 
rebuilt, the wartime refugees had been resettled and Finland had a 
functioning democratically elected government. These were certainly notable 
accomplishments for a country that bordered the Soviet Union and fought 
two wars against it. The "Valiant" image of Finland began to reappear as 
tensions between the wartime Allies began to increase. The "Honest" image 
reappeared under the guise of the hard working Finns rebuilding their 
country and meeting their reparation payments. That Finland had been 
allowed to maintain its democratic institutions was thought almost 
miraculous to the Anglo and American press, but the future was far from 
certain. Though the press in both countries recognized that Finland was a 
functioning democracy that wished to be neutral, the press did not altogether 
accept Finland's "unorthodox" neutrality.
V. SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS 
FINLAND FROM 1949 TO 1955
What we anticipate seldom occurs, 
what we least expected generally happens.
Benjamin Disraeli1
The highly tense atmosphere between East and West in 1949 was 
highlighted by the forming of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Finland's continued existence as an independent nation was by no 
means certain. Though Finland had for the moment escaped the fate of 
Czechoslovakia, it nevertheless, still had to cope with the daunting three 
"R's" of its postwar problems: reparations, resettlement, and reconstruction.
A few significant events brought much attention to Finland for short periods 
during this six year period, but for the remainder of the time Finland was 
relatively obscure in the Anglo and American press. The Finns concluded 
their reparation payments to the Soviet Union in September 1952. Seemingly 
in anticipation of this achievement, the 1952 Summer Olympics were held in 
Helsinki. In September 1955, the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Porkkala, 
and in December the Finns secured entry into the United Nations and the 
Nordic Council. The Finns believed that membership in these organizations 
legitimized their sovereignty and represented the acceptance by both the East 
and the West of Finland's neutrality.
The Finns were faced with high inflation caused by the reparation 
payments to the Soviet Union while making their payments. As strikes 
could cripple reparation industries and trigger steep fines from the Soviets,
1 Benjamin Disraeli, The Works of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, vol. 8, Henrietta 
Temple, (New York: Walter Dunne, 1904), 88.
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workers' wage demands were granted causing a vicious wage price spiral. 
After they had paid the reparations they needed to find new markets for their 
goods. The Soviet Union continued to purchase Finnish goods that were 
uncompetitive on the world market such as locomotives and other metal 
products. The Anglo and American press raised concerns that Finland's 
continued trade with the Soviet Union would give the Soviets undue 
influence on Finland. The press was surprised at the continued level of 
support for the Communists in Finland, given the determination of the 
Finnish people to maintain their independence.2
The American and Anglo press praised Finland highly for its ability to 
meet Soviet reparation demands. The "Honest" image of hard working and 
industrious Finns reappeared. After the reparation payments were 
completed, the press also presented themes of "Valiant" Finland, a lone 
democracy on the border of the Soviet Union. The press revealed surprise 
that Finland continued to be independent. Almost no reference whatsoever 
to Finland's participation in the Continuation War and the negligible aid it 
reluctantly gave to Germany could be found in the Anglo and American 
press. The Anglo and American press reflected a reservoir of goodwill for 
the Finnish people, even though Finland would not and could not openly 
support the West in the Cold War. American coverage of Finland, tended to 
be more favorable than British; however, British coverage of Finland was 
more extensive than American. While the American press focused on
2 The Communists share of the popular vote, the number of votes and the corresponding 
number of seats they won out of the 200 seat Eduskunta in Finland's first four postwar 
elections are: 1945 - 23.5 percent (398,600 votes), 49 seats; 1948 - 20.0 percent (375,800 votes), 
38 seats; 1951 - 21.6 percent (391,400 votes), 43 seats; 1954 - 21.6 percent (433,500 votes), 43 
seats. See John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 424-425. Perhaps this high level of support 
for the Communist party in Finland encouraged the Soviet Union to anticipate an internal 
Communist seizure of power in Finland.
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Finland individually, the British Press more frequently discussed Finland in 
relation to the Nordic context, particularly Sweden.
Press Opinion 1949-1952
The Economist thought that Finland would remain safe if Norway and 
Denmark were to join NATO. Finland's uncertain position was justification 
for Sweden's neutrality policy. In March, 1949, after Norway had decided to 
join NATO, the Economist commented that Finland was threatened more by 
ambitious party leaders, particularly the Agrarian Urho Kekkonen, than by 
any foreign threat. After NATO was officially formed on April 4, 1949, the 
Economist noted the storm that Finland had weathered in the past year. On 
April 5, 1948, the Finns had signed the Mutual Assistance treaty with the 
Soviet Union, and a year later NATO was created. Neither of these events 
lead the Soviet Union to seize Finland .3
As Norway's decision to join NATO was awaited, the Times asserted in 
March that Finland was keeping calm with the aid of good nerves. The Times 
thought that in Finland everything seemed "to be freely said and done in this 
markedly free thinking country." In April the Times observed that only 
Finland had escaped Communist control. Except for their base at Porkkala, 
the Russians were invisible in Finland. Although tied within the Soviet 
orbit by treaty, the Times contended that Finland had remained a country with 
a Western societal structure and a corresponding Western attitude to life.
The Finns believed that the 1948 Treaty was an agreement that Finland would 
be left alone in its domestic affairs if it pledged loyalty to the Soviet Union.
The Times thought that much suggested that the Finns had been right. The 
Soviets had not exercised political pressure on Finland and had dealt 3
3 "Decisions in Scandinavia," Economist, 26 February 1949, 361; "Final Decision by Norway," 
Economist, 12 March 1949, 457; "Finland Plods On," Economist, 23 April 1949, 753-54.
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reasonably with Finland on economic matters. "Three out of four Finns," 
asserted the Times, "detest the Soviet Union and its policies and seldom 
refrain from saying so." The freedom with which the Finns expressed their 
views was considered remarkable. Unique among the defeated nations, 
Finland had not been de-Nazified. Prevalent among the Finns was the view 
that Finland had not been defeated. Stories circulated of secret forest armories 
with arms for several hundred thousands and underground paramilitary 
organizations.4 56
Changes in Finland since the war had caused domestic problems. With 
the resettlement of the Karelian refugees and the subsequent government 
mandated land redistribution, 81 percent of Finnish farms were under 
twenty-five acres. The problem of land redistribution was amplified because 
only 3 percent of Finland was arable.5 The number of urban workers was 
increasing to meet the labor requirements of the reparations industries. The 
Agrarians were conscience of the need to prevent peasant impoverishment 
while the Social Democrats wanted to reduce costs for the urban consumer. 
Despite their difficulties, the Times said that Finns were confident that they 
could work out their problems if they were left alone.6
Throughout 1950, the Economist commented on the political divisions 
within Finland. It asserted that the Finns had learned the art of being 
independent of the Soviet Union without being provocative. Although the 
Finns had reached a consensus on their foreign policy, they were far from 
agreement on domestic policy. In June the Economist mentioned that an 
unhappy division in Finnish politics existed between the city and the country.
4 "Scandinavia and the West," Times(London), 3 March 1949, p4; "Statecraft in Finland," 
Times (London), 29 April 1949, p5.
5 Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Scandinavian States and Finland (Welwyn 
Garden City, Great Britain: Broadwater Press, 1951), 116.
6 "Statecraft in Finland," rfmes(London), 29 April 1949, p5.
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The conflict between townspeople and farmers, asserted the Economist in 
December, was acute. The personal rivalry of Kekkonen, leader of the 
Agrarian party, with the Social Democrats intensified the feelings of distrust 
between urban rural interests.7 8
Kingsley Martin, who opposed the NATO military build up, expressed 
admiration for the Finns in the New Statesmen. He observed that the Soviet 
Union had treated Finland with unexpected leniency since World War II. 
Finland, he noted, could not arm because of its treaty with the Soviet Union 
and necessity. Although most Finns hated Russia, Martin asserted that they 
believed that Norway's adherence to the Atlantic Pact was a mistake and 
regarded Sweden's neutrality as highly desirable. The Finns had combined 
prudence with defiance in their relations with the Soviet Union. Martin 
characterized them as a brave, determined, and proud people who were well 
aware of their country's delicate relationship with the Soviet Union. He 
continued that for Finland:
Every action has to be considered from the point of view 
of Finnish dignity in relation to her huge neighbor. The 
Finns are perhaps the least frightened people in Europe.
They have fought the Russians and know what war means. 
They would fight again, if compelled, but they do not court 
destruction, and they will not surrender their independence. 
They will live their own way of life trying, within limits of 
dignity, not to be provocative.8
Commenting on their daily lives, Martin asserted that flowers were treasured 
in Finland as in few other countries, because of the contrast of the flowers' 
bright colors with the long, dark and dreary Finnish winters. Martin, who 
judged the Finns to be melancholy but charming, found it hard to rate their
7 'Finns Under Pressure,'" Economist, 7 January 1950,16; "Good Terms for the Finns," 
Economist, 24 June 1950, 1380; "Labor Unrest in Finland," Economist, 16 December 1950, 1092; 
"Political Deadlock in Finland," Economist, 23 December 1950, 1152.
8 Kingsley Martin, "Scandinavian Notes," New Statesmen and Nation, 23 June 1951, 703-704.
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drinking tolerances because he had found it "comparatively rare to meet a 
Finn with less than four schnapps and several bottles of beer inside him. "9 
Martin's article combined political commentary with personal social 
observation separate from politics, displaying sympathy for the Finns and 
reinforcing the stereotype of the hard-drinking Finn.
In 1951, the Times praised the Finnish record of self help and their work 
ethic as they struggled to handle the problems that faced their country. The 
Finn's accomplishments included: the rebuilding of their export trade; the 
resettlement of Karelian refugees; industrial expansions; and the 
improvement of food supplies. "All of these remarkable achievements, 
asserted the Times, "indicate an outstanding record of individual effort." The 
effort of Finnish industry to master the reparations problem and 
simultaneously recover export markets was thought to be "a fine example of 
self help on a national scale."9 10
The Times thought that any nation with such a record was not likely to 
go Communist. Finland was the only country to have had a Communist 
Prime Minister and Interior Minister, and then dismiss them with an 
election. The Times thought that it might be safe to say that the danger of the 
spread of Communism had passed. Inflation, however, threatened to undo 
Finland's postwar economic and social achievements. Suffering under what 
was perhaps the world's worst inflation, the cost of living in Finland had 
risen nine times the 1939 price level. After the reparation payments were 
completed, Finland was faced with the prospect of a massive dislocation of its 
industrial workers. This danger had been averted by the Soviet Union's 
agreement to continue to buy Finnish products for six more years. The
9 Kingsley Martin, 704.
10 "Self Help in Finland," Times(London), 12 May 1951, p7.
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drawback of the agreement, according to the Times, was that the Finnish 
economy would be tied to the Soviet Union "with hoops of steel."11
It was difficult to resettle the 425,000 refugees, of whom 233,750 
depended upon agriculture for their livelihood. The Times repeated 
comments that it had made in previous articles that the rocky Finnish soil 
was poorly suited to cultivation and the size of the farms was small. The 
Finns could be proud, the Times said, of how they had handled the rural 
upheaval without causing undue social strain. Finland needed to work to 
prevent peasant impoverishment. Despite the difficulties the Finns faced, the 
Finnish spirit was determined to overcome them and felt "no need to 
indulge in sour grapes."1 2
Finland's external dependence, stated the Times was the price for its 
liberty at home. Although the Finns were free, the Times insisted that 
Finland was not independent in the true sense of the word. Finland was tied 
to the Soviet Union by every bond except political sympathy. The Times 
declared that it was essential for the West to forget the Winter War, which 
dominated Finnish history in western minds to the exclusion of all else, 
especially Finland's role as one of the defeated in World War II. The real 
reason Finland was free, contended the Times, was that Russia had nothing to 
gain by interfering. Its internal freedom was not because Stalin had a soft spot 
for Finland or because the Russians feared the Finns fighting qualities.
Finland had learned the futility of following a foreign policy opposed to 
Russian interests. The Times maintained that a real difference existed 
between Russian interests and Soviet interests but did not elaborate on these 
differences. Finland was in a tragic predicament, her heart was with the west 
but her eyes were in the east. Finland was linked with the west, particularly
11 "Self Help in Finland," Times(London), 12 May 1951, p7.
12 "Self Help in Finland," Times(London), 12 May 1951, p7.
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Scandinavia by trade, culture, and education. Finland placed much store in 
its cultural ties.!3
In the Finnish parliamentary elections of July, 1951, the Communist 
received 21.6 percent of the vote, less than either the Social Democrats or the 
Agrariansd4 Despite their high inflation, the Finns had rallied, asserted the 
Times, to the defense of democracy and freedom. Finnish democracy had been 
justified by its works. The Soviets had reasons for restraint, primarily, 
commented the Times, keeping Sweden out of NATO. According to the 
Times Finns were deserving of assistance. "The Western Powers have some 
obligation to lend a helping hand to this small but gallant people."15 In 
March 1952, Kekkonen advocated a neutral Scandinavian bloc. Controversy 
about neutrality, the Times observed, was as perennial as the seasons in
Scandinavia. Whatever their motivations, the Finns were not a Russian
1
satellite.16
The Economist praised the Finns for completing their reparation 
payments to the Soviet Union that had seemed to be beyond their ability to 
pay. The actual cost to Finland of producing and delivering the goods for the 
Soviet Union, estimated the Economist, was $949 million at 1944 price levels. 
Although forest products were 90 percent of Finland's exports, they were only 
allowed to account for less than one third of the value of its reparations to the 
Soviet Union. Though Finland had relieved itself of the burden of 
reparation payments, it was reliant on the Soviet bloc for future sales for its 
products. This, along with its geopolitical situation, commented the 
Economist, meant that Finland could hardly hope to translate its pro-Western 134*6
13 "Freedom of Finland,' Tfmes(London), 27 April 1951, p7.
14 John Wuorinen, A History of Finland, 425.
45 "Finnish Elections," TfmesfLondon), 6 July 1951, p5.
16 "Policy in the North," Tfmes(London), 3 March 1952, p5.
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feeling into action. Its new situation was unlikely to change Finland's 
cautious and ascetic foreign policy. The Economist believed that Finland's 
heart was with the West, even though its "mind," (its accurate appraisal of 
the political situation) caused it to be neutral.17
As the Finns concluded their reparation payments to the Soviet Union, 
the Times noted the staggering amount of the deliveries. The total length of a 
train hauling all of the reparations would be 2,135 miles and the ships 
delivered would make a line 18.5 miles long. The Times implied that 
Western Europe in general, and Great Britain in particular, would do well to 
model themselves after the Finnish work ethic. Western nations trying to 
afford rearmament for NATO could learn from Finland's "remarkable story." 
The payments were more onerous than the price indicated because the bill 
was based on what the Soviet Union wanted, not what Finland had. The 
Times noted that the Finns had made their reparations under harsh 
conditions: they had lost Karelia's resources, and their manpower had been 
depleted by the war. They paid with much sacrifice and hardship. The results 
had a cost, an industrial revolution had occurred overnight in Finland and 
the effects had not been absorbed. Finland had remained a free country, the 
Times stated, "preserving all the attributes of Western democratic values." 
Finland's next challenge was to find a world market for its goods.18
That Finland had remained independent and democratic was in itself a 
moral victory. The Winter War image of "Valiant" Finland remained in the 
Anglo press, but instead of fighting the Communists on skis, the Finns were 
voting against Communists in elections. The Times and the Economist paid 
close attention to political and economic developments in Finland and *189
17 "Finland Squares the Account," Economist, 20 September 1952, 700.
18 "Finnish Reparation to Russia," Times(London), 30 August 1952, p4; "A Finnish 
Achievement," T/mes(London), 4 September 1952, p4; "Finnish Reparations," Times(London),
19 September 1952, p5.
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praised its ability to successfully complete its reparation payments. The Anglo 
press, however, had less favorable praise for Finland than did the American 
press. Finland stood in stark contrast to the rest of Europe to the American 
press and public. While the United States was pouring money into Europe 
via the Marshall Plan, Finland was managing to pay stiff reparations without 
any Marshall Plan assistance. The American press presented an image of the 
Finns as an industrious, thrifty, and determined people.
In April, 1949, a New York Times article suggested that "the learned" 
study how the tiny nation of Finland recovered without help. After having 
fought two wars in five years, the bantam sized country ought, by all rules of 
common sense, "to be wallowing in despair and its people hungry and 
discouraged." With no Marshall Plan aid, the New York Times declared, 
"Finland has done the impossible - once more." The United States had given 
Finland a loan, not a gift. Finland was aware that Russia would not help and 
that the United States could not. By 1952, the New York Times observed that 
when the rest of Europe would stop getting Marshall Plan aid, Finland would 
have paid off her debt to the Soviet Union. It implied that Finland would 
probably be in a better economic condition than those nations that had 
received Marshall Plan aid from the United States.19
Lisa Sergio wrote in the Nation that it was clear to anyone who visited 
Finland that it was not behind the iron curtain. This was because of the 
Finns' firm and realistic behavior in an almost hopeless situation. Sergio 
asserted that in September 1944, every adult in the country expected that 
Finland would be taken over. The Finns were a "mixture of fatalism, cold 
logic, and courage," that the Russians had learned to respect. Had Sweden 19
19 Finns on Their Feet Despite Two Wars," New York Times, 10 April 1949, p 7.
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joined NATO, however, Sergio contended that Russia would probably have 
established bases in Finland whatever the cost.20
In August 1949, Newsweek commented that the staggering reparation 
payments had not caused Finland to kneel "under the bear's paw." Finnish 
resolution had prevented the iron curtain from descending upon them when 
they removed Communist officials from office in April, 1948. A world-wide 
shortage of timber products and $127 million in American loans had 
provided Finland's economic salvation. Finland received a $12.5 million 
loan from the World Bank, the first World Bank loan to an East European 
nation. The loan, Newsweek insisted, helped bulwark not only Finland's 
economy, but its freedom.21
During the winter of 1950 Time said that Finland was the top bidder for 
self improvement among the Nordic countries. Worried about manners, 
"particularly the knife brandishing belligerence of Finnish drunks," the Finns 
had stepped up a courtesy campaign .22  As in the other Nordic countries, the 
Finns participated in many organizations. A serious group, the Citizens' 
Good Behavior Organization, had the goal to make the common Finn a 
gentleman in time for the 1952 Olympics. Time observed that conditions 
must be improving in Finland as an anti-gluttony campaign was also 
receiving considerable support. A Finnish tailor had estimated that in the 
last two years 90 percent of his customers had gotten fatter. Apparently the 
lean years had passed .23
In March, 1950, the New York Times explained that the Finns success in 
maintaining their independence was "due to their demonstrated honesty as 2013
20 Lisa Sergio, "Finland - Unwilling Satellite," Nation, 23 July 1949, 75-77.
21 "Finland, Loan for Freedom," Newsweek, 15 August 1949, 36.
22 The stereotype of the hard drinking knife wielding Finn is widespread in Scandinavia 
and was brought to North America by Scandinavian immigrants.
23 "Gluttony and Glamor," Time, 6 February 1950, 55.
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well as to their axiomatic courage." The Finns had been as faithful on their 
payments to Russia as they had on their World War I debt to the United 
States. The Finns, said a New York Times editorial, "have character in the 
highest sense of the word." The editorial thought that it was "extremely 
improbable that the Soviets could ever swallow the Finns spiritually," even if 
they were to occupy the country. Finland, declared the New York Times, was 
no satellite.24
A New York Times editorial "Invincible Finland," declared that the 
purge of Finnish Communist leaders, reflecting Moscow's disappointment 
over the lack of Communist success, "was merely one symptom of the 
miracle that is postwar Finland." Despite two disastrous defeats, the burden 
of heavy reparation deliveries, and the presence of Soviet bases in Finland, 
the editorial remarked that Finland remained independent, defiantly reading 
American books, and electing non-Communists. The editorial said that it 
may be argued that the Soviets could end this anytime they wanted and 
install a Czech style "People's government." Such an argument, the editorial 
asserted,
misreads the current situation and gives far too little credit 
to the patriotic Finnish people. Moscow's 'forbearance' in 
Finland is that of a wolf who desists from eating foods he has 
found to be indigestible. Appeasers and 'neutralists' will do 
well to ponder the lesson of Finnish indigestibility and 
independence.24 5 26
Finnish obstinacy, stubbornness, and determination, credited the editorial, 
were responsible for maintaining Finland's independence.26
Helsinki was the host for the 1952 Summer Olympics. The city, 
reported Time, was bustling with activity. Although Russian guns were less
24 "Finland Keeps Calm," New York Times, 19 March 1950, p 8.
25 "Invincible Finland," New York Times, 1 April 1951, p 30
26 "Invincible Finland," New York Times, 1 April 1951, p 30.
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than a dozen miles from Helsinki, Time observed that "as in West Berlin, the 
people who live closest to danger are calmest about it." After discussing 
Finland's territorial loses to the Soviet Union, Time described Finland's 
remaining land as vast, rugged, and beautiful. Though the Finns were not 
"Northern ostriches," Time said that they closed their eyes to slights and 
sacrifices as long as they could preserve the essence of their independence. 
Though Finland had declined Marshall Plan aid, they had accepted a loan 
from the United States. When questioned about this, Premier Kekkonen said 
to reporters, "we live on fine distinctions." Saddled in 1944 with the stiffest 
reparations bill in history, Finland would have the bill paid in full before the 
end of 1952. Time observed: "Finland has emerged from doing the impossible, 
not naked and bankrupt but riding a wave of prosperity." Finland alone had 
remained outside the iron curtain. Finland's "characteristically Scandinavian 
Socialism" had eased the lot of workers everywhere, with wages rising faster 
than prices. A Finn commented that all of Finland could be found in the 
three S's: schnapps, sauna, and sisu. The sauna was the hardy Finns' favorite 
form of relaxation. Schnapps was the national drink. Sisu was an old mystic 
Finnish word that was untranslatable, denoting guts, the ability to pay debts, 
rout enemies and beat any odds without fuss or furor. Sisu, declared Time, 
was Finland's answer to Communism.27
In September of 1952, a Minneapolis Tribune editorial observed that, 
"Little Finland, unique among nations for its ability to pay debts good or bad, 
(emphasis mine) cleared its reparations account with the Soviet Union." The 
terms for Finland had been so severe, said the Minneapolis Tribune, that they 
made the Allies' treatment of Germany after World War I seem "like a 
suspended sentence." In 1944 Finland took on the staggering burden of $300
27 "Sisu," Time, 21 July 1952, 24-29.
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million in specific products, many of which Finland never produced before, 
particularly metal goods. Finland, nevertheless, expanded its shipbuilding 
industry and created a metals industry "from scratch." The editorial 
commented that the Finns' achievements recalled Churchill's Winter War 
statement that "only Finland. . . shows what free men can do." Finland faced 
a new problem, how to keep its expanded industries functioning. The 
dislocation in Finland, noted the editorial, would be as if the United States 
were to quit its foreign aid and military spending. Finland needed to find 
new markets for its goods. The Minneapolis Tribune believed that Finland 
merited special treatment, declaring, "certainly no nation is more deserving 
of cooperation and assistance in finding those markets than this bastion of 
freedom in the far north."28 This was a return to the image of Finland during 
the Winter War and before, but little or no negative impression from the 
Continuation War was apparent.
Finland had been praised admiringly in both the Anglo and American 
Press for meeting its reparation payments to the Soviet Union. The 
American press particularly drew comparisons to the Finns' payment of its 
World War I debt to the United States. Though the press recognized Finland 
as a functioning democracy, they did not consider Finland to be completely 
independent. The Finns were portrayed as an admirable and hardy people 
who were fated by their geography to live a bleak life in a bleak environment.
Press Opinion 1953-1955.
A thaw in the Cold War began in 1953 with the easing of tensions after 
Stalin's death and end of the Korean conflict. Finland was adjusting to life 
after reparations and having internal difficulties. With the absence of the 
outside threat of Soviet intervention that the reparation payments had
28 "Finland Pays off," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 20 September 1952, p 4.
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represented, the Finns struggled to deal effectively with the political problems 
in their own country. Demands had been suppressed since 1939 and now the 
Finns turned on themselves, the urban consumers and workers against the 
rural peasaints. In the international arena Finland tried to keep a low profile, 
but it took advantage of the "Geneva Spirit" to assert its neutrality.
In an intriguing article that did not explicitly mention Finland, the 
Economist praised neutrals but not "neutralists." The term neutrals applied to 
nations whereas the term neutralists referred primarily to political pacifists in 
Western Europe. Neutrals were trustworthy Samaritans and few of these 
remained to fill the thankless roles that the world needed. Neutralists, on the 
other hand, detracted from the maintenance of peace.29
The Manchester Guardian thought that Finland played a unique 
function in the world, it acknowledged its place in the Soviet sphere, yet it 
was left to govern itself democratically in the Western sense. Finland's 
position was of the greatest importance, contended the Guardian, in Sweden's 
policy and planning. Sweden's neutralists used Finland to justify their policy. 
The Guardian observed the "Northern contrast," the Nordic countries shared 
a community rooted in history, culture, and ideals; yet the geopolitical 
situation of a divided world had imposed diversity upon them.30
The Times stated in May 1954, that it was a good sign that Great Britain 
would once again be Finland's number one trading partner. The Soviet 
Union was unable to meet Finland's consumer needs. As Finland's economy 
drew near to dependence on the Soviet Union, the Times commented that its 
bonds with the West had been threatened. Helsinki's shops were filled with 
goods from the Soviet bloc that defied "the best efforts of salesmanship." It 
was difficult in practice for Finland to switch to Western goods because only
29 "Neutrals and Neutralists," Economist, 18 April 1953, 141.
30 "Northern Neighbors," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 2 December 1954, 8.
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the Soviet Union would purchase goods produced by Finland's uneconomic 
expansion.31
In April 1955, the Economist stated that Finland had learned how to 
direct warm smiles and friendly gestures in Moscow's direction while 
granting a minimum commitment. Finland was of political and strategic 
importance for the Soviet Union. At the time Finland was economically 
dependent upon the Soviet Union, but it was as viable as any of the 
Scandinavian countries, according to the Economist. Finland remained a 
vigorous democracy and, thought the Economist, it should be credited for its 
courageous performance, but it may not be able to hold out indefinitely.32 
Finland, said the Manchester Guardian, was the only "liberated or 
conquered Soviet border country" that was permitted to be a functioning 
democracy. The strong ties that Finland had kept with Sweden, contended 
the Guardian, had contributed to the Soviet's agreement to withdraw from 
Porkkala. The policies of Finland and Sweden had kept Sweden out of NATO 
and Finland out of the Warsaw Pact. By giving up Porkkala the Soviets had 
an example of Soviet disarmament to show the world and could buttress the 
Paasikivi line in Finland.33 The Economist considered the Soviet withdrawal 
from Porkkala to be a very astute political move. The Soviets were showing a 
new sophistication. The West may prefer the "good old days" when Soviet 
policy was exercised without camouflage.34
After the Soviets had announced that they would withdraw from 
Porkkala, the Times was quick to point out that Porkkala was not as valuable 
in the atomic era as it had been in 1944. The Soviet move cost them nothing
31 "Trade Links with Finland/' Times(London), 22 May 1954, p7.
32 "Finland asked into the Parlor," Economist, 16 April 1955, 185; "The Bear at Finland's 
Door," Economist, 30 April 1955, 363-64.
33 "Peace in a Cold Climate," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 15 September 1955, p 8.
34 "Full Marks for Moscow," Economist, 24 September 1955, 1019.
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and they hoped to reap rewards in Finnish and Scandinavian public opinion, 
as well as strengthen their bargaining position at Geneva. The Soviets were 
calling for the abolishment of American bases in Europe. The withdrawal 
from Porkkala was welcomed, said the Times, for the relief it would give to 
the Finns after years of steadfastness and courage. Paasikivi went to Moscow 
to sign the documents for the Porkkala withdrawal and the Finnish-Soviet 
treaty extensions. It was the seventh time that Paasikivi had been to Moscow, 
but it was the first time he had returned to Finland happy. The Finns 
believed that their sovereignty had been reaffirmed and their international 
status enhanced by the return of Porkkala to Finland.35
On Christmas Eve, 1955, the Economist observed that in the past year 
Finland had secured entry into the United Nations and the Nordic Council, 
and obtained the agreement of the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from 
Porkkala. These events proved to the Finns the correctness of Paasikivi's 
policy: Finland should establish and maintain good relations with the Soviet 
Union by observing all its obligations but avoid subservience in international 
affairs and maintain trade and cultural relations with the West. This policy 
required a cool head in management, but the Finns now seemed to be 
successfully pursuing it.36
After Finland had completed its reparation payments to the Soviet 
Union, the Anglo press began more frequently to refer to Finland as a unique 
and or special role in the World. The Anglo press remained concerned about 
the extent of Finnish trade with the Soviet Union and its effect upon British 
trade with Finland. The Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala was seen as an 
effort to gain a public relations advantage over the West. The American press
35 "Future of Russian Bases in Finland," Times(London), 16 September 1955, p 8; "Russian 
Gesture to Finland," Times(London), 19 September 1955, p8; "Foreign Bases," Times (London), 
19 September 1955, p9; "Russo-Finnish Pact Signed,"Times(London), 20 September 1955, p8.
36 "Finland's Wider Windows," Economist, 24 December 1955, 1112.
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was to treat the Soviet's Porkkala move similarly. The American press also 
began to identify Finland as a nation that had succeeded despite extremely 
difficult circumstances.
In January, 1953, Alan Spencer noted in Foreign Affairs that Finland had 
received much attention for its seemingly impossible achievement of paying 
off Russia, but he believed that the maintenance of democracy in Finland 
deserved more attention. Early 1948 was critical for Finland. Western morale 
following the coup in Czechoslovakia was low. Spencer stated that the 
Finnish character, the "dogged patriotism and bold shrewdness of the Finns," 
was responsible for the failure of the Communist to take over Finland. The 
country's coat of arms, he noted, was a Lion that brandished a crusader's 
sword and trampled a scimitar. The coat of arms clearly symbolized a clash 
between East and West with Finland being part of the West. Spencer said that 
capitalist factory owners and business men had assisted the socialists to 
prevent the communists from gaining the support of more workers. Spencer 
. realized that it paid Russia to leave Finland alone. There were strong 
grounds, he thought, for a reasonably optimistic view for Finland's future. Its 
weaknesses were its dependence on a single commodity and a distorted 
economy. Finland's advantages, Spencer stated, were low defense 
expenditures and pride.37
In 1953, over a year after completing its reparation payments to the
Soviet Union, the New York Times commented that Finland was running into
serious economic difficulties. Finland was outside of the United State's
foreign aid program and had borne the terrific burden of $1.8 billion in war
damages and reparations. The Finns dependence on the Soviet bloc markets
gave the Soviet Union a powerful lever. The New York Times thought that
37 Alan Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, January 1953, 
301-309.
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the United States and the West should consider additional measures to keep 
Finland out of "Soviet clutches."38 The reality, however, was that had the 
Soviet Union wanted to take Finland, the United States would not have 
intervened militarily to prevent it.
The Finnish-American historian John Wuorinen stated in Foreign 
Affairs that the steadiness of the Finnish character, made their elections seem 
the most predictable in the world. By now, Wuorinen claimed, Finland 
occupied a special position. It had not been destroyed by internal Communist 
initiatives or "economic blood letting." He stated that Finland was not a 
Soviet hostage and the Soviet Union was content with it. Nevertheless, he 
admitted, that some 430,000 Finns had voted Communist in 1954 national 
elections, and the Communist maintained 43 out of the 200 seats in the 
Eduskunta. This baffling support could not be explained entirely by 
proportional representation. The number of Red voters greatly exceeded 
party membership, so other Finns, thought Wuorinen, must have viewed 
the Communists as a protest vehicle or expected that the party could produce 
desired results. Prestige remained for the immediate postwar appeal of the 
Soviet Union's propinquity. Also, anti-Communist activities were difficult 
in Finland and the Communist functioned under the name of "People's 
Democrats." Wuorinen contended that at a time when the United States was 
unable to prevent Red expansion in Korea and Indo-China, abandoning 
Finland and Sweden would be appeasement with "fatal consequences." 
Finland was a frontier to be defended. Wuorinen argued that "Morality and 
military security suggest the West put a 'no trespassing' sign at Finland's 
border. "39
38 "Finland's Plight," New York Times, T7 November 1953, p 26.
39 John Wuorinen, "Finland Stands Guard," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, July 1954, 651-660.
93
In April of 1955, Robert Haeger wrote in Newsweek that it suited 
Russia's purposes for Finland to remain a free country. The "Honest" and 
"Valiant" images of Finland underlined Haeger's analysis of Finnish traits 
which he said were trustworthiness and grit. The Finns, he recalled, had paid 
their World War I debts to the last penny and fought the Russians to a 
standstill on skis. Finland was tied to the East economically, yet was 
determined to maintain its independence. Haeger stated that Finland's 
economy was permanently distorted and consequently hopelessly tied to 
Soviet markets. For example, the Finnish metals industry prices were 30 
percent above world levels. The Finns remained officially aloof from the 
Nordic Council because of Soviet denouncements yet the Finns participated 
in the common Northern labor market that provided for reciprocal social 
benefits and travel between the Nordic countries without passports. Haeger 
asserted that what the Finns wanted was Swedish style neutrality.40
The Soviet Base at Porkkala had lost much of its value, and the Soviets 
could retake it without great difficulty. The Minneapolis Tribune stated that 
though it was good that Finns were to be relieved of the burden and 
humiliation of Russian occupation, the withdrawal was not a disinterested 
act of magnanimity. The Porkkala withdrawal was part of a Soviet peace 
offensive to get the United States out of Europe. If the Soviets succeeded, 
Porkkala would indeed be a small price to pay. The Minneapolis Tribune 
insisted that American bases in Europe were not comparable to the Soviet 
base at Porkkala.4i
Hansson Baldwin wrote in the New York Times that the Soviets' 
Porkkala gesture had "major propaganda and psychological importance but
40 Robert Haeger, "Finland: Survival in a Soviet Shadowland," Newsweek, 11 April 1955,
56.
41 "A Base for Base," Minneapolis Morning Tribune, 20 September 1955, p 6.
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no strategic significance." A New York Times editorial also discussed the 
implications of the Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala. The editorial 
commented that Finland was, as Khrushchev had previously said, a small 
country and the Soviets were pursuing larger aims. The Soviet's ambitious 
goal was the removal of American forces based overseas. If the Soviets were 
successful, then a token retreat of a few miles could open up continents to 
further Soviet expansion. The editorial declared that there was no possible 
doubt of Finland's Western orientation.42
Newsweek's Ernest Lindley regarded Finland as a "hopeful anomaly" in 
postwar Soviet policy: Finland had not been Communized. It stood alone 
among nations that the Soviet Union held in its grip, and no puppet regime 
had been imposed. Lindley observed that the trade arrangements between the 
Soviet Union and Finland were eminently satisfactory for Moscow. It 
appeared the Soviets benefited more from their Finnish Policy than their 
Eastern Europe policy. The Soviet's Finnish policy had given the Soviets 
economic benefits and the Finns were not rebellious, Sweden had remained 
neutral, and Finland was not a sore issue of East versus West. Lindley 
thought that Finland demonstrated a workable alternative to Stalin's actions 
in Eastern Europe. Finland in fact represented the pattern that Franklin 
Roosevelt had hoped for after World War II of independent and freely elected 
governments in Eastern Europe that were not hostile to the Soviet Union. 
With the Soviets returning Porkkala, Finland's situation, said Lindley, 
though less than ideal, was honorable. He contended that the Finnish people 
and their political institutions were compatible with the conscience of the free
42 Hansson Baldwin, “The Porkkala Gesture," New York Times, 20 September 1955 p 7; "In 
the Soviet Design," New York Times, 22 September 1955, p 22.
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world. The Soviet Union, he argued, should do the same for Eastern Europe 
that it had done for Finland.43
Summation
From the Winter War until 1955, Finland was seemingly in a state of 
constant crisis. After years of struggling for survival, Finland had successfully 
dealt with the problems of resettlement and reparations. As 1955 ended, 
Finland was poised to concentrate on self-improvement and raising its 
standard of living along the lines of its Nordic neighbors. The young nation 
sought a return to normalcy that had not existed for a generation. The 
Paasikivi line was established as Finnish foreign policy and appeared to be 
accepted by both the East and the West. The conceptions of Finland in the 
Anglo and American press were favorable. They portrayed Finland as a 
democratic nation that shared "Western" values but that circumstances did 
not allow it to exercise a pro-West foreign policy. The return of Porkkala, 
though highly valued in Finland, was quickly discounted by the Anglo and 
American press as a Soviet public relations ploy. The Anglo press explained 
Finland's continued independence as the most expedient course of action for 
the Soviet Union. The American press, however, would often credit Finnish 
resolve. Though little attention was paid to daily life in Finland, when 
events brought attention to Finland they were often events of significant 
achievement, in which Finland appeared to be extraordinary and exceptional 
when compared to other nations thought to be in similar circumstances. The 
Anglo and American press identified Finland as a special case.
43 Ernest Lindley, "Hopeful," Newsweek, 26 September 1955, 38.
VI. CONCLUSION
This thesis has shown that the West's image of Finland and its policy 
towards Finland as portrayed by the Anglo and American press was indeed a 
case in the framework of power politics and diplomacy. This study has also 
shown that during the Winter War the Anglo and American press exalted 
Finland as a heroic nation, but both the United States and Great Britain had 
higher priorities than to help Finland. This thesis demonstrated that during 
the Continuation War the Anglo and American press partly explained 
Finland's co-belligerency with Nazi Germany by distinguishing between the 
Finnish people and the Finnish government. From World War II to 1955, 
this thesis has shown that the press image of the Finnish people was 
consistently positive despite Finland's co-belligerency with Germany in the 
Continuation War and its neutralist policy during the Cold War. This 
examination of the popular press in Great Britain and the United States 
reveals that although the countries were allies in World War II and the Cold 
War, some differences occurred in their respective coverage of Finland, as 
their national interests diverged.
This thesis strongly suggests that Soviet interests in Finland and 
Scandinavia were defensive, not expansionistic. The Soviet Union was 
concerned with its security, not spreading communist ideology. The United 
States and Great Britain did not recognize this during the Cold War. The 
Anglo and American press often speculated as to why the Soviet Union had 
not absorbed Finland. This thesis supports the view of the Scandinavian
96
97
balance theory. The Soviets did not want to upset the peaceful status quo in 
Scandinavia after World War II.1
From the Winter War of 1939-1940 until the Soviets agreed to 
withdraw from Porkkala in 1955, the Finns and the world witnessed a period 
of great change and transition among the Great Powers. The coverage of 
Finland in the Anglo and American press during this time not only revealed 
the turbulent events of Finnish history, but existence of subtle differences of 
interest between the United States and Great Britain. The difficulty of small 
nations caught between Great Powers is underscored. Finland's basic policy, 
preservation of its own independence, never changed. In pursuing this 
policy, however, Finland was to see itself in political alignments that 
contradicted the interests of the Western democracies. Finland went from 
being a heroic defender of Western civilization to an ally of Nazi Germany. 
The Cold War was to once again find Finland not aligned with the West. 
Finland had determined that it would follow the Paasikivi Line and try to 
maintain cordial and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, in the Anglo and American press coverage of Finland, 
an underlying reservoir of good will is apparent. Finland is a small power on 
the periphery of Europe that can not by itself be an influential military or 
economic power, and consequently it was rarely in the public eye. When it 
was brought to the attention of the Western press, however, it was often by 
exceptional circumstances. Finland was the only nation to pay its World War 
I debt to the United States, continuing to pay throughout the Great 
Depression. Finland fought the Soviet Union alone in the Winter War and 
received tremendous sympathy from the Western democracies. Finland
1 See Max Jacobson, Finnish Neutrality, 91-101, for a discussion of the Scandinavian balance 
theory.
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found itself once more at war against the Soviet Union in 1941, but this time 
the Soviet Union was fighting against Germany and with the Allies. After 
World War II the Finns remained a functioning democracy despite having 
lost two wars to the Soviet Union. After the Czech crisis in 1948, Finland did 
not suffer the same fate as Czechoslovakia, despite expectations in the press 
that it would. And while Western Europe was receiving economic aid from 
the United States, Finland paid off its reparations to the Soviet Union. These 
few events served to create and reinforce images of Finland that Berry has 
described as "Honest" and "Valiant" Finland.
Finland offers an intriguing case for thought and reflection. Issues are 
not always simple, but Great Powers seek to simplify issues as right or wrong 
to justify their own particular interests. After Great Britain declared war on 
Finland in 1941, Mannerheim said that the Finns took it "as a sign that 
morality no longer had any meaning in high politics."2 It is no accident that 
it has been small nations that have taken the lead in developing 
international law and international organizations. No justice can exist in 
world where, to paraphrase Thucydides, the powerful take what they can. 
Finland's history from 1939 to 1955 offers a ray of hope for other small powers 
caught in the orbit of a powerful neighbor that they can survive and retain 
some measure of independence. Though Finland's foreign policy has been 
dictated by Soviet security concerns, it has retained domestic autonomy, its 
own culture and its own institutions.
The press also tends to simplify events, often to serve a particular 
agenda. In 1968 Max Jakobson, Finnish diplomat and United Nations' 
representative, wrote that the West's prevailing image of Finland continued 
to be based upon the Winter War. Since then the Finns had lived "virtually 2
2 Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshall Mannerheim, 438.
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incognito" among the nations of Europe, creating a gap between the 
traditional image and reality.3 The image of Finland in the Anglo and 
American press contained errors and exaggerations of Finnish reality. The 
American press waxed eloquently about Finnish sisu, but the Soviet Union 
did not allow Finland to remain independent out of fear of Finland. The 
Soviet Union followed a policy that it thought would achieve Soviet 
interests. Had the Soviet Union occupied Finland, then neutral Sweden 
would have joined NATO and the Soviet Union would have enemy forces 
uncomfortably close in the Baltic. Besides keeping Sweden out of NATO, 
Soviet policy towards Finland provided them with good propaganda for the 
Third World and Western Europe as a successful model of "peaceful 
coexistence."
It is surprising that a single small country could captivate the press of 
Great Britain and the United States. Consider the obstacles against Finland's 
popularity. The Finnish language is not related to the Germanic and 
Romance languages of Europe and therefore is rarely learned by non-native 
speakers. Finland's own population has always been small and the Finns 
have never had a large immigrant population in the United States. Presently 
less than 0.3 percent of Americans claim any Finnish ancestry3 4 
Notwithstanding their very small numbers in the United States, the Finns 
have had a fairly high profile in the mining and forest industries in the upper 
Midwest and certainly more so than in Great Britain.
How can one account for Finland's positive image? In the Anglo and 
American press Finland's image was often a function of the state of relations
3 Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, 1.
4 United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993, 
(Washington, D.C.), 1993, 51. In the 1990 census 659,000 people identified themselves as 
being of some or all Finnish ancestry out of the United States' population of 243,710,000.
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between the Soviet Union and the West, but not exclusively so. Individuals, 
as well as Great Powers and the press, like to simplify issues and opinions.
The Winter War alone was not responsible, for the heroic images it evoked of 
“Valiant" Finland no longer had any relationship to the realities of the 
Continuation War and the Cold War. Finland was appealing to the 
intellectuals who were acquainted with the musical works of Sibelius and 
academic circles were captivated by the Kalevala, the national Finnish epic. 
These groups, though small, were the influential groups that the journalists 
and editors of the periodicals covered in this study frequently belonged to.
The Olympic exploits of Paavo Nurmi in the 1920s received international 
attention and provided a positive image of Finland among the general public. 
Finland's harsh and inhospitable climate and geography make life there 
difficult and hard work is a prerequisite for mere survival. The press 
described the Finns as stolid, determined, obstinate, even fascists and 
socialists, but no one called the Finns lazy. All these intangibles combined 
with images from Finland's debt payment and the Winter War to form and 
reinforce a positive image of the Finnish people.
Since Finland was a small power with no prospect of being anything 
else, praising the characteristics of the Finnish people would harm the 
national pride of neither Great Britain nor the United States. Both nations 
could praise the Finns without abandoning any pretense of their own 
national greatness. Both the Anglo and American press saw the Finns as 
exhibiting characteristics that the press regarded as admirable traits of their 
own country. “Little Finland" could be regarded as an honorable “little 
brother" by both the British and the Americans. The Finnish work ethic and 
the Finn's gallantry in the Winter War appealed to the fading Victorian 
values of British society. The Finns rugged individualism and outdoor
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lifestyle appealed to America's romanticism of the frontier in addition to 
Finland's reputation in the United States as an honorable debtor. The 
American press and people have a great love for the underdog and Finland fit 
that role. Another reason for the reservoir of good will for Finland is its 
association with the other Scandinavian countries and the generally positive 
impression of Scandinavia in the United States and Great Britain. The 
Nordic countries have a reputation for having a high standard of living, and 
they live quietly in peace with other.
The Anglo and American press coverage of Finland also revealed 
changes that were occurring in Great Britain and the United States. Berry 
stated that international relations is primarily the resolution of domestic 
tensions in an international context.5 The British press revealed the psyche of 
an Empire that recognized itself to be in decline whereas the American press 
reflected the United States' prewar isolationism and its postwar ascendancy. 
Great Britain suffered terribly in World War II and had a very slow and 
difficult recovery. The British, who were victorious in the war may have 
thought that the Finns, who had been on the losing side, did not have it so 
bad. The United States, however, was exuberantly enjoying an economic 
prosperity that it has never known before or since. The United States interest 
in Finland was geopolitical, but it was the Anglo press that more frequently 
refer to the relationship of Finland to Sweden and the other Nordic nations. 
The British were more concerned with their own wartime survival and 
following the war, their own economic recovery. The American press tended 
to be more favorable towards Finland than the British, and the American 
press also presented a more simplified image with less detailed coverage.
5 R. Michael Berry,American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception, 454.
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Americans are prepared by their history for expansion, asserts Berry, if 
not geographically at least economically and ideologically. As Americans find 
it difficult to think in terms of limits, they have tended to conclude that 
recognition of the status quo contains the seeds of decline. He finds it ironic, 
"that if the debt payment image of of the 1930s stood for what Americans 
hoped the world would become, the Finlandization image of the Cold War 
era became a symbol of what Americans feared the future held."6 The 
Americans and British misread Soviet intentions as being motivated by 
ideological expansionism rather than national security. This caused the 
Americans and the British to speak disparagingly of "Finlandization," fearing 
that the Soviet Union could effectively "neutralize" Western Europe.
Considering how geopolitical reality bound Finland, a democratic 
nation with a free market economy, to the Soviet Union, Finland's coverage 
in the Anglo and even more so in the American press, could indeed be 
regarded as a special case. The Finnish people were consistently regarded 
positively, though many times their policy and particular traits were 
criticized. Hints of guilt are detectable in the Anglo and American press that 
the West could not "rescue" Finland from the Soviet Union. Their seems to 
be an assumption that Finland wants to be "one of us" but is destined by 
geography not to be. This assumption reveals a certain degree of 
ethnocentrism. What Finland wanted was to be allowed to pursue its own 
interests as they saw fit, and avoid being caught constantly in a tug of war 
between Great Powers. After having made mistakes along the way and 
suffering from tragic misfortune, Finland had managed to survive, and that 
in itself is a success story. Daily survival, however, is not very dramatic, and,
6 Berry, American Foreign Policy and the Finnish Exception, 435.
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